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DEPOLITICIZING LEGAL AID: A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION ACT
The Legal Services Corporation Act (LSCA) I was enacted in
1974 after stormy debate in both Houses of Congress and a Presi-
dential veto of a previous version of the bill.2 Although few legis-
lators openly disputed the premise of the Act, that "providing legal
assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate legal
counsel will serve best the ends of justice . . . ,"' the mechanics of
realizing this goal had long been a controversial subject on Capitol
Hill. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Legal Services
Program,4 established during the Johnson administration, an-
tagonized many conservatives by advocating "law reform" in addi-
tion to rendering legal assistance on a case-by-case basis. 5 Critics
' Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2996-961, 29 7 1e (Supp. IV, 1974).
' The President's Message to the Senate Returning S. 2007 Without His Approval, 7 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Docs. 1634 (Dec. 9, 1971). The history of the controversies that have surrounded
legal services programs and proposals has been well chronicled. See, e.g., E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE
AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1974); Bowler,
National Legal Services---the Answer or the Problen for the Legal Profession?, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
415 (1973); George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 681
(1976); Note, Legal Services-Past and Present, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 960 (1974); Note, The Legal
Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Interference, 81 YALE L.J. 231 (1971). For a journalistic
account of the controversies generated by the Legal Services Corporation Act see Arnold, And
Finally, 342 Days Later .... Jums Doc-ToR, Sept. 1975, at 32; Arnold, The Odyssiy of Legal Services
and the Games Politicians Play, JURIs DOCTOR, Oct. 1974, at 23. The historical foundation set
forth in this literature serves as the point of departure for this Note's analysis of the Legal
Services Corporation Act.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2996(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
4 The OEO Legal Services Program was not specifically authorized by the legislation
establishing OEO. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 88 Stat. 508, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-29961 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). A 1965 amendment to that Act,
since repealed however, did state that OEO could sponsor additional programs for the poor
not explicitly provided for by Congress. Act of Oct. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-253, § 12, 79 Stat.
974. See Note, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 960, supra note 2, at 960 n.4, 964 n.21.
' The Office of Legal Services deemed law reform a legitimate concern of OEO Legal
Services Program attorneys. "Advocacy of appropriate reforms in statutes, regulations, and
administrative practices is a part of the traditional role of the lawyer and should be among the
services afforded by the program." Office of Economic Opportunity, Guidelines For Legal
Services Programs 23 (1967). Even as late as 1973, the Comptroller General's evaluation of the
Legal Services Program criticized inadequate involvement in the law reform area, concluding
that grantees ought "to develop a plan for achieving... law reform objectives." Comptroller
General of the United States, The Legal Services Program-Accomplishments of and Prob-
lems Faced By Its Grantees, G.A.O. B-130515, at 18 (Mar. 21, 1973). See Sullivan, Law Rfonn
and the Legal Services Crisis, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1971); Note, 81 YALE L.J. 231, supra note 2, at
255-56.
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protested that the OEO program was dominated by "ideological
vigilantes" who subsidized their own radical crusades with Legal
Services Program funds.6 In 1973, President Nixon authorized dis-
mantling of the OEO Legal Services Program,7 forcing Congress to
consider alternative legal assistance bills.8 Liberals and conservatives
were in agreement that any new legal services program must be
politically neutral, but consensus regarding particular proposals was
difficult to reach because legislators defined political neutrality from
differing perspectives. Conservatives stressed that the new legal
services program must be free of political taint from within; that is,
the legal services program must not become a vehicle for social
reform or a base for political action.9 Liberals wanted to isolate the
new program from outside political pressures to ensure that the
executive and legislative branches of government would be unable
to compromise the professional independence of legal services at-
torneys. 10 The Act Congress finally passed reflects the concerns of
both conservatives and liberals and is loaded with provisions de-
signed to depoliticize the rendition of legal services to the poor.
After describing these depoliticizing provisions, this Note will
analyze two classes of statutory prohibitions: restrictions upon the
types of cases legal services attorneys may handle, and restrictions
upon the political activities of these attorneys. Both classes of prohi-
bitions, although evidencing congressional concern that federally
sponsored legal aid programs not be used as a tool of social reform
or be identified with any political ideology, raise serious constitu-
tional issues. Furthermore, the underlying assumption of the LSCA
that legal aid to the poor can be totally depoliticized is questionable.
6 Agnew, What's Wrong With The Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930, 931 (1972). The
controversy generated by the OEO Legal Services Program's attention to law reform, perhaps
the "hottest" legal services issue, is discussed in the materials cited in note 2 supra, and in
Sullivan, supra note 5. In JuSTICE AND REFORM, supra note 2, Earl Johnson defended law
reform as a legitimate goal of the OEO Legal Services Program.Johnson, a former Director of
that program, asserted that test cases, the prime vehicle for law reform, generated "benefits to
the poverty community [which) outweighed the cost of the program by a ratio of approxi-
mately 7 to 1." Id. at 232. Another participant in the Legal Services Program, however, while
acknowledging that test case litigation "has had some significant effects on the lives of poor
people[,]" observed that the concern with law reform did detract from the quality and quantity
of attention given to the day-to-day case load. Vanaman, Book Review, 10 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-
Civ. LIB, L. REV. 772, 778 (1975) (emphasis in original).
7 See Note, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 960, supra note 2, at 966.
8 See Bowler, supra note 2, at 430.
' See 120 CONG. REc. 831 (1974) (remarks of Senator Fannin); 119 CONG. REc. 41,631-33
(1973) (remarks of Senator Helms).
10 See discussion of the genesis of the "corporation" concept in Bowler, supra note 2, at
427-28. See also George, supra note 2, at 690-98.
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It is unrealistic to expect that an institution enabling the poor to
assert legal rights will remain politically uncharged. Indeed, any
effort to give the poor greater access to the courts is bound to offend
some political sensibilities. Such considerations suggest that several
of the restrictions designed to depoliticize legal services will not only
fail to achieve their stated purpose, but in fact will serve to inject
politics into the provision of legal assistance to the poor. This will
occur for two important reasons. First, by restricting certain Legal
Services Corporation (LSC) activities that were thought to be politi-
cally charged, Congress has legitimized further politically motivated
criticism of the LSC. Second, since the LSC is dependent upon
congressional appropriations, it will be susceptible to political pres-
sure emanating from Congress.
I
DEPOLITICIZING LEGAL SERVICES: AN OVERVIEW
In setting forth the goals of the Legal Services Corporation Act,
Congress declared that "to preserve its strength, the legal services
program must be kept free from the influence of or the use by it of
political pressures . . . ." In conformance with this statement, the
new legal services program is administered by a corporation, inde-
pendent of the executive and legislative branches of government.1 2
The corporate form is designed to insulate the program from "poli-
tics," thereby establishing its independence of action and political
neutrality. Several other provisions are designed to protect the
LSC and its personnel from political pressures. Political tests or
qualifications may not be applied in selecting employees for the
Corporation or its recipients.1 3 In addition, Corporation employees
" 42 U.S.C. § 2296(5) (Supp. IV, 1974).
12 See id. § 2996b (authorization of corporate form); id. § 2996d(e)(1) (dissociation of
Corporation from federal government).
13 Three classifications which recur throughout the LSCA ought to be set forth to avoid
unnecessary confusion: "Recipient" means any grantee, contractee, or recipient of financial
assistance from the Legal Services Corporation. Id. § 2996a(6). Local legal aid programs are
the primary "recipients" of assistance from the Corporation. "Corporation" means the Legal
Services Corporation. Id. § 2996a(2). Thus employees of the Corporation are employed
directly by the Corporation while employees of recipients work for entities funded by the
Corporation. "Staff attorney" is defined as a lawyer who earns at least 50% of his professional
income from federally funded legal services work. Id. § 2996(a)(7). But see Proposed Regula-
tions for the Legal Services Corporation Act, § 1600.1, 41 Fed. Reg. 18,512 (1976), which
states that only attorneys receiving more than half of their professional income from recip-
ients "organized solely for the provision of legal assistance to eligible clients," are to be
considered staff attorneys. (Emphasis added.) This regulatory definition, if adopted, will
greatly reduce the class of staff attorneys.
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and staff attorneys in legal services offices are prohibited from
pressuring coworkers to support political causes .or candidates. 14
The LSCA also contains provisions to ensure that the Corpora-
tion and its recipients maintain an apolitical course of conduct. For
example, an employee may not intentionally identify the Corpora-
tion or recipient with social causes, political parties, or political
organizations, 1 5 and legal services attorneys may not engage in "any
political activity" while on duty.' 6 Similarly, a separate provision
prohibits employees from engaging in "any public demonstration or
picketing, boycott, or strike"'7 while carrying out legal services ac-
tivities. Furthermore, at no time may such personnel engage in "civil
disturbance" activity that violates a court injunction, or "any other
illegal activity.' 8 Additional off-duty restrictions are imposed on
staff attorneys.' 9 No funds of the Corporation may be used to
advance "particular public policies"; 20 no corporate funds, person-
nel, or equipment may be made available to any political party,
political organization, candidate for public office, or to promote any
14 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(e)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides that the political conduct of employ-
ees of the Corporation is regulated by portions of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1970 &
Supp. IV, 1974). 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974) subjects staffattorneys to § 1502a of
the Hatch Act. For a more detailed explanation of the Hatch Act see note 103 infra.
'5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e(b)(5)(B)(iv), (e)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
16 Id. § 2996f(a)(6)(A). Resort to the legislative history is necessary in order to understand
that this section distinguishes off-duty hours from on-duty hours. See notes 99-100, 148-55,
161 and accompanying text infra.
17 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974). An exception to the ban on public demon-
strations, picketing, boycotts, or strikes is made for matters pertaining to the employee's
personal employment situation. Id. Regulations promulgated by the Corporation tracking this
provision may be found at 40 Fed. Reg. 42,362 (1975). In addition, employees are prohibited
from encouraging others to engage in these activities and from advising others to violate
outstanding injunctions. Id.
A suit has recently been filed attacking the constitutionality of this restriction. Welfare
Rights Org. v. Cramton, Civil No. 75-1938 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 20, 1975). The plaintiffs, a
welfare rights organization, its chairman, and a legal aid attorney who rendered legal advice to
the organization regarding the lawfulness of various public demonstratiorns, have alleged that
such advice is essential to the organization's enjoyment of first amendment rights. Addition-
ally, plaintiffs have charged that the LSCA advice restrictions constitute a fifth amendment
deprivation of liberty without due process "since they are not free to obtain required legal
assistance from the only source available to them." Id., complaint at 8-9. The plaintiff attorney
has alleged that the restrictions violate due process because they interfere with his professional
duty as an attorney to fully and completely advise and represent his clients. Furthermore, the
plaintiff attorney claims a first amendment right to "demonstrate in support of his clients." Id.
at 9.
18 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(5)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). This provision also prohibits attorneys from
engaging in voter registration activity or voter transportation, unless such activity is incidental
to the rendition of legal advice or representation.
9 Id. See notes 96-127 and accompanying text infra. For the statutory definition of "staff
attorney" see note 13 supra.
20 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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ballot measure;21 no legal services office may organize coalitions or
associations, e.g., tenants' or welfare rights organizations, unless
necessary for the provision of bona fide legal assistance to eligible
clients;2" and no federaIly-funded legal services entities may lobby
before legislative or administrative bodies.2 a
Finally, the LSCA places restrictions on the types of cases legal
services attorneys may handle and the nature of advice they may
provide. Legal services attorneys may not represent clients in de-
segregation suits,2 4 abortion cases,25 selective service and military
desertion cases,26 criminal proceedings and habeas corpus actions,27
or fee generating cases.28 Staff attorneys are also prohibited from
bringing any class action that has not been approved by their pro-
gram superiors.2 9 The LSCA provides that no employee may "en-
21 Id. §§ 2996e(d)(3-4).
22 Id. § 2996f(b)(6).
23 Id. §§ 2996e(c)(2), 2996f(a)(5). Lobbying prohibitions imposed on legal services attor-
neys have been attacked as unconstitutional in the context of state regulation of such attor-
neys. See Botein, The Constitutionality of Restrictions on Poverty Law Firms: A New York Case Study,
46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 748 (1971). In practice, however, the effect of the LSCA lobbying restric-
tions may be minimized by the willingness of the Corporation to construe a wide variety of
lobbying activities as incidental to client representation. Dean Roger Cramton, Chairman of
the Board of the Legal Services Corporation, has suggested such a policy:
[P]articipation in administrative or legislative proceedings may often be appropriate
or necessary in order to advance or protect the client's interest.
... If full and zealous representation means suing city hall, or attacking a federal
or state administrative regulation, that is what the poor client should get. Some
controversy may result, but it is the duty of the board-and, I believe, the legal
profession as a whole-to defend legal services lawyers who are doing their job in the
best professional manner ....
Cramton, The Task Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A.J. 1339, 1342-43 (1975).
24 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by grant
or contract, may be used.., to provide legal assistance with respect to any proceeding
or litigation relating to the desegregation of any elementary or secondary school or
school syslem ....
See notes 33-94 and accompanying text infra.
25 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
No funds made available by the Corporation under this subchapter, either by grant
or contract, may be used ... to provide legal assistance with respect to any proceeding
or litigation which seeks to procure a nontherapeutic abortion or to compel any
individual or institution to perform an abortion, or assist in the performance of an
abortion, or provide facilities for the performance of an abortion, contrary to the
religious beliefs or moral convictions of such individual or such institution.
See notes 33-94 and accompanying text infra.
26 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(9) (Supp. IV, 1974).
27 Id. § 2996f(b)(1).
28 Id.
29 Id. § 2996e(d) (5). The significance of this provision is subject to differing interpreta-
tions. It may be viewed as an attempt to allocate the limited resources available to legal services
programs by weeding out trivial or frivolous suits. The discretion vested in the project
directors to approve such suits, however, presents the ominous possibility that authorization
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courage" others to engage in public demonstrations, picketing,
boycotts, strikes, riots, civil disturbances, or any illegal activity.3 0 A
legal services attorney may not advise anyone to violate outstanding
court injunctions .3  The enforcement devices established by the
LSCA are twofold: employees who violate any of the above rules
may be "disciplined," and the Corporation may withhold funding
from any recipient organization that engages in or tolerates viola-
tions.32
II
RESTRICTIONS ON CLASSES OF LITIGATION
As previously noted,33 the LSCA forbids the expenditure of
corporation funds on abortion and desegregation cases. 34 The legisla-
tive history of these restrictions reveals congressional disapproval of
controversial Supreme Court decisions in these areas.35 In fact, no
will depend upon political factors. Indeed, staff attorneys, the persons constantly identified by
critical legislators as the greatest threat to the program's political neutrality (see discussion of
the extraordinary limitations imposed upon staff attorneys' political activities in notes 104-27
and accompanying text infra), are the only legal services lawyers who must get prior approval
to bring class actions--a fact which suggests that the draftsmen of this provision intended it as
a device to prevent the initiation of politically disfavored actions. This theme is developed in
notes 33-94 and accompanying text infra.
30 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(5)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). A suit has been commenced challenging
the constitutionality of this provision. See note 17supra. Although a thorough consideration of
the restriction limiting the nature of advice that a legal services attorney may provide to a
client is beyond the scope of this Note, the apparent inconsistency of this provision with other
aspects of the LSCA deserves mention. The advice restriction cannot be reconciled with the
following portion of the LSCA, which exalts the professional independence of legal services
attorneys: "[A]ttorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to protect the best
interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of Professional Responsibility ...." 42
U.S.C. § 2996(6) (Supp. IV, 1974). Moreover, Congress has committed the Legal Services
Corporation to "insure the maintenance of the highest quality of service and professional
standards, the preservation of attorney-client relationships, and the protection of the integrity
of the adversary process from any impairment in furnishing legal assistance to eligible clients
.... Id. § 2996f(a)(1). This conflict is noted in Bowler, supra note 2, at 432-33.
3, 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV, 1974).
32 Id. §§ 2996e(b)(1)-(2).
33 See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra.
U This Note concentrates only on the abortion and desegregation restrictions for two
reasons. First, the legislative history surrounding the restrictions on these types of cases
reveals a clear congressional intent to "punish" advocates of the causes of abortion and busing.
Second, because of this clear legislative history, these restrictions lend themselves to analysis
under the Supreme Court's new equal protection line of decisions. See notes 73-94 and
accompanying text infra.
3' Typical of the rhetoric used by supporters of the restrictions was a speech by Rep-
resentative Hogan, sponsor of an original version of the abortion restriction:
[Tihese poverty law activists assume that abortion is good for the poor.... It is not
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:734
Congressman who supported the restrictions advanced any basis
other than the unpopularity of abortion and busing to support the
restrictions,3 6 although opponents of the restrictions did challenge
their constitutionality during the floor debates. 37
This section of the Note will examine the validity of these
restrictions under the first amendment and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Although the restrictions probably do not
infringe the first amendment rights of legal services attorneys or
their clients, a strong argument can be made that they violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution, as applied to the federal
government through the fifth amendment due process clause. 38
A. The First Amendment Right to Litigate
The LSCA restrictions may be attacked as directly infringing a
right protected by the broad language of the first amendment. In
enough that the poor.., have the legal right to slaughter an unknown person, but
legal services activists want the Federal Government . . - to pay for the deed.
120 CONG. REc. H. 3967 (daily ed. May 16, 1974). The House, however, had no monopoly on
inflammatory prose. Senator Bartlett, sponsor of the Senate version of the busing restriction,
stressed the unpopularity of abortion at great length in supporting the restrictions.
[Abortion] is anathema to a substantial portion of the American taxpayers.
My amendment would prohibit legal services attorneys from involving them-
selves with abortion issues .... [I]t is obvious ... that a substantial number of our
citizens are opposed to abortion on demand.
120 CONG. REC. S 824-25 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974).
36 Although at least one supporter of the busing restriction did cite statistics on the cost of
busing litigation, compiled by Harvard's Center for Law and Education, an OEO legal services
backup center, the statement was made not as a justification for the restriction but as an
indication of how legal services attorneys had thwarted the popular will. See 120 CONG. REC. S
928 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1974) (remarks of Senator Tower). Senator Tower's speech is represen-
tative of the tactic used by proponents of the restrictions:
My concern is that the American taxpayers, who have repeatedly shown their overwhelm-
ing opposition to forced busing, have been paying $1.5 million in the last three years to
... prosecute this case .... I can assure you the people of Texas will not stand for
Federal funding of... forced busing.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Tower, the only Senator to mention the cost of funding a busing
suit, did so not to point out that these funds could be allocated more rationally to other parts
of legal services, but instead to indicate how legal services had been thwarting the popular will.
37 Opponents of the restrictions made only a feeble effort in opposition; Representative
Abzug did manage to suggest that the issues raised by the restrictions were of constitutional
dimension. See 120 CONG. REC. H. 3957 (daily ed. May 16, 1974). In the one colloquy on
constitutional issues that occurred during the debate over the restrictions, Representative
Abzug raised the potential equal protection problems posed by the restrictions and noted that
Congress, by enacting the restrictions, was continuing the discrimination against the poor
which the bill sought to remedy. 120 CONG. REC. H. 3957 (daily ed. May 16, 1974). In replying
to Representative Abzug, Representative Meeds, a supporter of the restrictions, brought up
the standard argument in favor of any legislative classification. "[Ilt is not a deprivation of
constitutional rights for the Federal Government to put conditions on the expenditure of its
funds." 120 CONG. Rc. H 3957 (daily ed. May 16, 1974).
38 See Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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NAACP v. Button,39 for example, the Supreme Court held that a state
could not forbid the plaintiff civil rights organization from hiring
staff attorneys to represent both members and nonmembers of the
association in civil rights litigation. 40 The Court stated that members
of the NAACP had a right to associate in order to foster common
goals and that this first amendment right was threatened by the
challenged regulations. 41 One of the techniques for achieving these
common goals was litigation; hence, for the state to infringe the
right of the NAACP to litigate was in effect state infringement upon
the right to associate. The state's undoubted power to regulate the
conduct of attorneys42 was subordinate to the plaintiff's first
amendment rights.43 Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court cases
have struck down state restrictions on group legal service plans, even
though the groups sponsoring such plans did not use litigation as a
vehicle for fostering political goals. 44
Although Button indicates that groups affected by the LSCA
restrictions would have the right to organize private legal assistance
programs to litigate abortion cases, 45 the holding does not suggest
39 371 U.S. 415, 433-38 (1963).
40 Id. The Virginia statute under consideration by the Court forbade attorneys from
accepting employment by any organization that was neither a party to litigation nor pecuniar-
ily interested in the outcome of the litigation. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, -78, -79 (1958), as
amended, (1974).
41 371 U.S. at 429-31.
42 The Court noted that the state's interest in regulating the solicitation of business by an
attorney was designed to prevent champerty and barratry and thus to prevent misuse of legal
process. This interest, the Court reasoned, was not served by the statute. 371 U.S. at 439. The
Court argued that "[riesort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a
different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use of the legal process for
purely private gain." 371 U.S. at 443.
43 The Court found the Virginia statute to be potentially stifling of all litigation brought
to vindicate the civil rights of black people, since it made effective advocacy of civil rights cases
difficult, if not impossible. The Court stressed that civil rights cases were "unpopular" in
Virginia and that the petitioner's activity was one way of making the advocacy of civil rights
litigation "meaningful." 371 U.S. at 434-38.
" See, e.g., United Transp. Workers Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971);
UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). These three cases, unlike Button, stressed the freedom of associa-
tion issues inherent in group legal service plans and downplayed the free speech aspects of the
right of a group to hire or recommend attorneys for its members. Thus, in the Trainmen case
the Court noted: "Laymen cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights ... and for
them to associate together to help one another to preserve and enforce rights granted
them.., cannot be condemned as a threat to legal ethics." 377 U.S. at 7. This problem of
deciding whether free speech or associational rights are involved in the right to hire an
attorney or to litigate to express one's political beliefs is especially important when, as in the
legal services restrictions, legislative restrictions do not touch the right of groups to litigate, but
do affect the right of free speech of individual clients and attorneys.
45 Just as the NAACP had the right to hire attorneys to handle desegregation cases, so,
underButon, a state could not restrict the right of a women's organization to hire attorneys for
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that the right to litigate civil cases encompasses the right to have an
attorney provided by the government. Nevertheless, by relying on
dicta in Button, an argument against the LSCA restrictions might be
tenuously constructed.
The Button majority rejected Virginia's argument that since
individual plaintiffs could vindicate their constitutional rights
through the use of non-NAACP counsel, a state could forbid the
hiring of attorneys by a group. Justice Brennan, for the majority,
wrote that NAACP counsel were necessary to make the plaintiffs'
right to litigate "meaningful,' 46 since private attorneys in Virginia
were reluctant to take civil rights cases. 47 The majority also noted
that litigation was a form of "political expression" 48 for the NAACP.
From this reasoning, two potential lines of first amendment
attack on the LSCA restrictions could be advanced. First, if litigation
is a form of political expression protected by the first amendment, it
should include protection of an attorney's right to express his own
political beliefs through litigation. Thus restrictions on the attor-
ney's right to use litigation for political ends would run afoul of first
amendment protection.49 Second, if a client's right to litigate in-
women seeking abortions. Button, Trainmen, and Mine Workers clearly establish the right to
group legal services if they establish nothing else. See, e.g., Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case
for BRI, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 306 (1965); Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76
YALE L.J. 966 (1967).
16 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated: "Chapter 33 . . . prohibits every
cooperative activity that would make advocacy of litigation meaningful." 371 U.S. at 437-38.
See also United Transp. Workers Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971). In
Transportation Workers, the Court also spoke of "collective activity undertaken to obtain mean-
ingful access to the courts" as being protected. 401 U.S. at 585.
47 371 U.S. at 443.
48 In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving
private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality.... It
is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves unable to achieve
their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts.
Id. at 429.
Justice Brennan's cryptic reference to litigation as a form of political expression led the
Illinois Court of Appeals to hold that group legal services were only protected when the group
hiring the attorney had political objectives. But the Court refused to limit Button in such a
manner in UMW v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221 (1967), whereJustice Black, writing
for the Court, suggested that rights to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of
grievances were implicated in group legal services cases. 389 U.S. at 222. Exactly whose right of
free expression-that of a group or that of an individual member of a group-is infringed by
restrictions on the hiring of an attorney is not made clear in the Button line of cases. The issue
is further complicated by the statement in Transportation Workers that "[tihe common thread
running through our decisions ... is that collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful
access to the courts is a fundamental right .... " 401 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added).
49 This argument rests on the assumption that in some cases, especially those involving
controversial issues such as busing or abortion, an attorney is both an advocate for his client
and a spokesman for the cause he advocates. This reasoning involves an acceptance of the
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cludes the right to a competent advocate, then arguably prohibiting
a client from choosing a legal services attorney in abortion or de-
segregation cases would deny him the "most meaningful representa-
tion"50 and would infringe upon his first amendment right to liti-
gate.51
An argument premised on the unqualified right of an attorney
to bring political cases, however, faces three strong objections. First,
assuming that such a right does exist, Congress has not encroached
upon that right in the LSCA. LSCA-employed attorneys are argu-
ably free to bring suits of their own choosing so long as federal funds
are not expended on such efforts. 52 No court has held that Congress
uneasy assumption that the lawyer must and will use the courtroom as the forum for a political
statement-that in fact the lawyer in his decision to take certain types of cases is making a
political statement. Thus, it is argued, if the client has a right to use courtrooms for political
expression, and if that right cannot be infringed by state action under Button, then similarly a
lawyer's right to use his skills of advocacy on one side of a controversial issue is also a form of
political expression that cannot be infringed by state action. This is especially true when the
limitations deprive a lawyer of his opportunity to make a statement through advocacy on one
side of a controversial legal issue. This argument has been advanced by a legal services
attorney who is challenging the LSCA restriction of picketing on behalf of a client. See note 17
supra.
For a discussion of the lawyer as a political advocate, see Clark, Lawyers in the Civil Rights
Movement--Catalytic Agent or Counter-Revolutionary?, 19 KAN. L. REv. 459 (1971); Dorsen, Role
of the Lanyer in America's Ghetto Society, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 50 (1970); Lyman, State Bar Discipline
and the Activist Lawger, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 235 (1973); Note, Rebel With A
Cause: The Movement Lawyer in the Criminal Courts, 2 Am. J. CRIM. L. 146 (1973). The latter Note
suggests that whatever the traditional view of the lawyer's role, many activist attorneys
perceive themselves to be political advocates rather than neutral counsellors. For the more
traditional view of the lawyer's role, see A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 17,
where the drafters pointedly note: "Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants." See also id. No. 10.
50 Any argument along this line must again rest on the assumption that the "meaningful
advocacy" spoken of in Button and Transportation Workers is a personal right implied from the
right of free speech, and not a group right incident to the right of free association. See note 46
supra. If there is only a group right to band together toward the end of achieving meaningful
advocacy, it is difficult to argue that the individual client has a right to choose his own attorney.
Perhaps the strongest language supporting an individual's right to litigate with the lawyer of
his choice in civil matters is contained in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S.
1 (1964), where the Court wrote: "A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the
professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public
to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress ...." 377 U.S. at 7.
" This argument avoids the difficult problem of arguing that the Constitution guaran-
tees a civil litigant the right to counsel. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text infra. Rather,
one could argue that although government need not provide counsel to civil litigants, once
counsel is provided the government may take no action infringing the lawyer's right to use the
courtroom for political expression or the client's right to choose a legal services lawyer to
handle his case.
52 Although the restrictions on abortion and desegregation cases relate only to the
expenditure of corporation funds on such suits, other restrictions may operate to limit the
ability of an attorney directly employed, or whose salary is partially funded by the Corpora-
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must fund the free speech activities of citizens,53 although such
funding may itself be permissible under the first amendment. 54
Second, it can be argued thatButton held that the right to litigate was
incidental only to the client's right of association and not to the
client's right of free speech. 55 Because a client's right of association is
not affected by the LSCA restrictions, no constitutional objection
can be made on this basis. The group legal service cases following
Button strengthen this line of analysis. 56 Third, although it may be
conceded that a client has a first amendment right to litigate to
express his political views, a strong argument exists against extend-
ing such protection to attorneys. Any political expression made in
the course of litigation is the client's; the attorney is not party to a
suit and acts only as his clients representative. If the first amend-
ment does protect speech through litigation, it would seem that the
speech protected is the client's and nbt the attorney's.
An argument premised on the client's right to unlimited choice
of attorney in civil actions is also weak because it depends upon the
assumption that there is a broad right to counsel in civil cases.
Although scholars have argued that such a right ought to exist, 57 no
tion, to take such suits on his own time. For instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974)
provides that full-time staff attorneys may take uncompensated outside cases only as au-
thorized in guidelines promulgated by the Corporation. Should the Corporation issue restric-
tive guidelines, staff attorneys might be restrained from taking abortion or desegregation
cases on their off-duty hours, even if they did not charge a fee. Similarly, id. § 2996i(c)
provides that grantees shall not spend any nonfederal funds for a "purpose prohibited by this
subchapter," although grantees are allowed to make "other arrangements with private attor-
neys [and] private law firms" for the provision of otherwise prohibited services. Two questions
are raised by this section of the Act. First, do the abortion and desegregation restrictions on
the spending of federal funds make the taking of an abortion or desegregation case a
"purpose prohibited by the Act"? Second, would a shared-time arrangement between a
grantee and a local law firm allowing an attorney employed by the grantee to take abortion
and desegregation cases on the private firm's time fall within the exception to the proviso in id.
§ 2996i(c)? To date no clear cut answers are apparent.
51 An exception to the general rule that the first amendment does not require the
government to promote all forms of speech equally is found in the field of broadcast regula-
tion, where the Supreme Court has held that a licensee of the Federal Communications
Commission may be required to give equal time to all political points of view. See, e.g., Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In general, however, the first amendment
is a restriction on government and not a positive command to actively promote free speech. Cf.
Avins v. Rutgers University, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968)
(held right to free speech does not imply that state university must accept all articles submitted
to law review).
'4 In Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), the Court held that the gove:nment could
distribute funds to political candidates on a nondiscriminatory basis without violating the first
or fifth amendments. Id. at 672-77. The Court noted, however, that such funding was not
required by the first amendment. Id. at 672-73.
ss See note 50 supra.
56 See notes 44-45 supra.
5 For an effective argument that whatever the constitutional underpinnings for a right
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court has yet so held.58 Consequently, there is no basis for requiring
that Congress make a full range of legal services available to indi-
gents where criminal litigation is not involved. Moreover, the right
to meaningful advocacy was linked by the Button court to the right of
association. 59 Since no associational rights are infringed by the
LSCA restrictions, no authoritative first amendment basis for chal-
lenging the restrictions exists.
B. An Equal Protection-Due Process Analysis
1. Two-Tiered Analysis
There is a two-step inquiry in any traditional equal protection-
due process analysis of a legislative classification. First, does the
classification discriminate against a suspect class of citizens 60 or de-
prive any group of fundamental rights?61 If the answer is affirmative,
to counsel are, there ought to be, as a matter of good social policy, court-appointed counsel in
civil cases, see O'Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 OHIo
ST. L. J. 1 (1967).
58 For examination of the right to counsel in habeas corpus hearings see Flowers v.
Oklahoma, 356 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1966); Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 890 (1945); United States ex rel. Duchin v. Follette, 251 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Each court concluded that counsel need not be provided because habeas
corpus is a civil, rather than criminal proceeding.
59 371 U.S. at 431-45.
60 The criteria by which a classification becomes suspect have never been fully explained
by the Supreme Court. For a definition of some indicia of"suspectness," see Jistice Brennan's
opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-91 (1973). There, speaking for four
members of the Court, Justice Brennan asserted that sex is a suspect classification. The nation's
"long and unfortunate history" of discrimination based on sex, "an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth," was analogized to race and nationality. Id. at 684,
686. Since classifications based on the latter factors are clearly suspect, Justice Brennan
reasoned that sex is also a suspect class.
This opinion provides some guidance in explaining the factors that unite the groups that
have been found to be suspect classes; it provides little instruction, however, as to why some
groups that have suffered from historic discrimination based solely upon some immutable
characteristic have not been included in the suspect category. Justice Brennan made a convinc-
ing argument that women have been victims of past discrimination based solely on the immuta-
ble characteristic of sex; yet he failed to persuade a majority of the court that sex is a suspect
classification. Therefore, the only clear statement that can be made is that certain classifica-
tions have been held suspect. The clearest suspect classification is one based on race. See, e.g.,
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Alienage is also a suspect class. See, e.g, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
61 The Supreme Court, in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1972), severely restricted the definition of fundamental right, at least for purposes of
applying strict scrutiny to a governmental classification ostensibly infringing these rights. The
Court held: "tT]he key to discovering whether education is 'fundamental' ... lies in assessing
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
411 U.S. at 33-34. Thus, the Court attempted to distinguish, however roughly, between
benefits such as education, and rights such as free speech; only the latter category of rights,
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a court will apply strict scrutiny to the classification and demand that
the government show a compelling state interest to support the
discriminatory scheme. 62 Second, if the answer to the first inquiry is
negative, a court will inquire whether or not the classification has a
rational basis and serves some legitimate governmental purpose.63
An argument can be made in favor of adopting a strict scrutiny
standard of review in assessing the constitutionality of the LSCA
restrictions. Certainly, one can argue that the abortion restrictions
exact a penalty for the assertion of a fundamental right, and hence
should be subjected to strict scrutiny under the doctrine of Shapiro v.
Thompson.64 This line of analysis has been followed in cases where
those explicitly or implicitly mentioned in the Constitution, were held fundamental. There-
fore, only a classification that infringed the latter category of rights was subject to strict
scrutiny. The analysis of theRodriguez Court is not, however, the only method of approaching
cases involving infringement upon an interest that does not achieve fundamental status. See
note 73 infra.
62 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968). In Shapiro, Justice Brennan
outlined in classic fashion the first test in the two-tiered equal protection analysis: "[Aippellees
were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional." 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original).
The compelling state interest test referred to in Shapiro is almost impossible to satisfy. See,
e.g., Welford v. Battaglia, 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1973); Cianciolo v. City Council, 376 F. Supp.
719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Barnes v. Michigan Veterans Trust Fund, 369 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D.
Mich. 1973). The one striking exception is that in time of war the Court has held military
necessity to outweigh the interests of a suspect class whose rights had been violated.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (detention of Japanese justified by
wartime exigencies). Korematsu has a deservedly bad reputation because of the violations of
civil liberties tolerated by the Court in the name of military necessity. Paradoxically, Korematsu
was the forerunner of the suspect class-compelling interest line of equal protection analysis.
63 The rational basis test is grounded in notions of due process as well as in notions of
equal protection. Under traditional criteria developed by the Court, however, the rational
basis test is easily satisfied. Justice Brennan, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966),
noted that for the Court to find a rational basis for a congressional enactment it need only "be
able to perceive-a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."Id at 653.
Clearly, a court could "perceive a basis" for almost any congressional act.
64 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court dealt with a Connecticut
statute that denied welfare benefits to those who had lived in Connecticut for less than a year
before applying for such benefits. The Court struck down the statute on the grounds that its
purpose was to deter migration of people into the state and that no justification offered by the
state was sufficient to save the statute. The Court held that "any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of [the] right [to travel]" is invalid unless a "compelling governmental
interest" is shown to justify the classification. 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original). The
Court, however, significantly retreated from Shapiro in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See note 61 supra. Moreover, one can read U.S.D.A. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973), as limiting the scope of Shapiro to those cases involving direct infringe-
ment on constitutional rights. In Moreno, the classification indirectly infringed rights of associa-
tion, but the Court considered the case in terms of a sliding-scale equal protection analysis. See
note 73 infra. This interpretation of Moreno finds support in the concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas, who analyzed the case under the compelling state interest standard of Shapiro. 413
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Medicaid restrictions on the funding of abortions have been struck
down. 65 One can also argue that the desegregation restrictions in-
volve a racial classification, and hence discriminate against a suspect
class. 6
6
There are several difficulties with this analysis. Although the
adoption of a strict scrutiny standard would almost certainly result
in striking down the restrictions, recent Supreme Court cases have
indicated that a different standard of review will be applied to cases
where the infringement on a right is indirect rather than direct.67
Moreover, the ban on desgregation suits, although singling out a
class of litigation of special interest to racial minority groups, is
grounded in a legislative history that shows no hostility to these
groups per se, but rather shows a hostility to the busing remedy for
desegregation. 68 Nevertheless, the arguments in favor of applying a
strict scrutiny standard are defensible.69
U.S. at 545. This Note concludes that these restrictions fail no matter what standard of review
is applied. The Court, however, does seem to be retreating from the broad language of
Shapiro.
" See Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112
(10th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.S.D. 1975). The Medicaid restrictions,
however, directly infringe upon the right to abortion, since women are denied funds for
abortions. The LSCA restrictions are more indirect, since they merely deny a woman funds
for a lawyer to assert her right to an abortion. Of course, if her legal claim is invalid, she may
have no right at all. Thus, the LSCA restrictions interfere with the exercise of fundamental
rights, although they do not directly restrain the exercise of these rights. In any event, the
courts in the Medicaid abortion cases, although applying a strict scrutiny test to the restric-
tions, also decided in each case that the Medicaid restrictions failed to meet a rational basis test.
66 See note 60 supra and cases cited therein.
67 See note 64 supra.
6 See note 36 supra.
'9 Courts have been willing to find that a classification is directed at racial minority
groups in fact, even where on the face of the statute no discrimination is apparent. See, e.g.,
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), in which the Court found that an amendment to a
city charter requiring voter approval of a fair housing ordinance unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated against racial minority groups, since it singled out "laws to end housing discrimination
based on 'race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry' " to run the gauntlet of voter
approval. Id. at 390. The Court added, however, that
although the law on its face treats Negro and white ... in an identical manner, the
reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority. The majority needs no protection
against discrimination.
Id. at 391. Thus, Hunter may be read as holding that, at least in matters of race, the Court will
go beyond the nondiscriminatory words of a statute to examine its impact on minority groups.
On the other hand, in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Court upheld a law
mandating a referendum on low-rent public housing projects, finding that the law was not, on
the record, aimed at racial minority groups. The LSCA restrictions on taking desegregation
suits are more closely analagous to Hunter; however, the government could argue that the
statutory classification does not directly infringe on the rights of blacks in particular, since
both whites and blacks are forced to use private attorneys in desegregation cases. And, using
James, the government could argue that nothing in the legislative history of the LSCA shows a
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:734
Clearly, no other suspect class is discriminated against by the
LSCA restrictions. Even if one were to make the questionable as-
sumption that indigents are such a class,7 0 it is evident that the LSCA
restrictions do not make an invidious discrimination based on indi-
gence. The LSCA confers no benefit on the rich that is denied to the
poor, nor does it involve any state-imposed barrier to the poor's
enforcing their right to an abortion or to attend desegregated
schools. 7' Rather, the distinctions drawn by the statite are based on
the type of case involved. All individuals similarly situated are
treated alike; both rich and poor must rely on private counsel to
vindicate their right to abortion and to attend desegregated schools.
Must the restrictions, therefore, be judged solely in light of an easily
satisfied rational basis test? Under traditional equal protection anal-
ysis, the answer would be yes and the outcome almost certain.72
congressional desire to single out blacks for unfair treatment. Therefore, the statutory clas-
sification is racially neutral.
70 Although the Supreme Court has given some past indication that indigence may be
categorized as a "semi-suspect" class (see, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)), these cases
involved either the imposition of filing fees as a condition of access to the courts, or the denial
of free transcripts or attorneys to indigents in cases where appeals were provided of right.
Thus, the Court has been willing to examine classifications based on wealth under a strict
scrutiny test only when other rights were denied by the classification. In addition, notions of
due process have been invoked together with equal protection arguments. InBoddie, the Court
noted that the state's filing fee denied indigents "an opportunity to be heard." 401 U.S. at 380.
In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), however, the Court limited the application of
the Boddie decision, and rejected challenges to a bankruptcy filing fee on both equal protection
and due process grounds. Id. at 446-50. Finally, in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court held that one challenging a statute on wealth
discrimination grounds must meet two threshold tests before the Court will consider such a
challenge. Individuals discriminated against on the basis of wealth must be "completely unable
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they (must have] sustained an absolute
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that lbenefit." Id. at 20. Moreover, the Court
held that indigents must show that a classification discriminates "against a class of definably
poor' persons" before an equal protection challenge may be made. Id. at 22.
" Thus, an indigent challenging the statute will not be able to show that the statute
discriminates against a class of poor persons, since the essence of discrimination for 14th
amendment purposes is state action conferring a benefit, directly or indirectly, on one class of
persons while denying it to another suspect class. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1973). The rich have no benefit conferred upon them by the
LSCA that is denied to the poor, nor does the statute impose a barrier against the poor's access
to the courts, as did the filing fees struck down in other wealth discrimination cases. See note
70 supra. Both rich and poor have an equal right to litigate their abortion and desegration
claims; any disparities in the ability to litigate those claims is based not on state-imposed
discrimination, but rather on the disparities in wealth resulting from private economic
realities.
72 If a court need only "perceive a basis" for the restrictions, the government could
easily argue that Congress might have found that the restrictions are necessary to allocate
resources, or to prevent fraud. The allocation of resources argument would be particularly
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2. Sliding-Scale Analysis
A few recent cases, however, suggest that the two-tiered analysis
of equal protection-due process is not the only test that a legislative
classification must meet. Rather, the Supreme Court has suggested
that in certain instances a sliding-scale equal protection analysis will
be applied to legislative classifications. 73 Under this test, the interest
effective, since the Supreme Court has long recognized the need for legislative discretion in
allocating social benefits. Thus, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court
noted that when economic and social legislation "not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights" is before the Court, it will grant the legislature wide latitude in allocating such
benefits. Id. at 484.
73 The origins of the new equal protection-due process analysis are uncertain. Notions of
substantive due process are certainly emerging from recent Supreme Court scrutiny of
legislative classifications, but it is not dear whether this new substantial interest test is rooted in
the due process or the equal protection clause. In the case of a federal statute, of course, only
the due process clause of the fifth amendment is at issue.
The current introduction of a third level between the strict scrutiny and rational basis
tests began in the sex discrimination area. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme
Court struck down an Idaho statute that gave automatic preference to men in appointment as
administrators of decedents' estates. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, used the
rational basis test as propounded by the Court in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920), to invalidate the classification. Id. at 75-77. In Royster, the Court struck down an
economic regulation because it violated substantive due process, holding that a classification
must rest "upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 253 U.S. at
415. This substantive relationship test has subsequently become the Court's mode of analysis
in sex discrimination cases. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
The substantial relation test was more fully articulated in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972), a case involving discrimination against illegitimates. Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, attempted to redefine the Court's treatment of the equal protection
clause in interest-balancing terms:
The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause
have been variously expressed .... The essential inquiry in all the foregoing cases
is, however, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classification
promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?
Id. at 172-73 (citations omitted). Justice Powell then showed that the classification bore no
k'significant relationship" to a valid state goal. Id. at 175. This test of significant or substantial
relationship between legislative ends and means where fundamental interests are involved has
now become the preferred mode of analysis in cases where illegitimates are involved. See, e.g.,
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
In a related line of procedural due process cases, the Court has also engaged in interest
balancing when the right to a hearing prior to deprivation of some benefit is involved. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Justice White, concurring in Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), applied the equal protection interest-balancing test to a due
process case when he wrote:
[I]t must now be obvious ... [that] as the Court's assessment of the weight and value
of the individual interest escalates, the less likely it is that mere administrative
convenience and avoidance of hearings or investigations will be sufficient to justify
what otherwise would appear to be irrational discriminations.
Id. at 459.
The sliding-scale test has also been applied in a situation where legislative history put the
Court on notice that an otherwise justifiable classification was used to punish those who
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of the plaintiff infringed by a legislative classification will be bal-
anced against the state interest served by the classification. 4 As the
classification begins to affect some fundamental right, or discrimi-
nate against a group having some indicia of a suspect class,75 the
Court will demand that the government show the classification serves
a substantial governmental interest. This test then becomes stricter
than the rational basis test, but less onerous than the compelling
state interest test, because the government need only demonstrate a
substantial interest. Should the sliding-scale analysis be applied to
the LSCA restrictions? This Note argues that it should and that
under such analysis the restrictions must fall.
The LSCA restrictions create two classes of otherwise eligible
legal services clients and deny benefits to one class solely on the basis
of the type of case. In U.S.D.A. v. Moreno,76 the Court considered a
legislative classification that discriminated among otherwise eligible
food stamp beneficiaries solely on the basis of their living arrange-
ments. Moreno and the LSCA restrictions make analogous classifica-
tions. Moreover, a similar legislative purpose prompted the enact-
ment of both sets of classifications. Moreno, therefore, furnishes an
appropriate touchstone for analyzing the LSCA restrictions. The
case also illustrates the type of analysis undertaken in sliding-scale
equal protection challenges.7 7 In Moreno, the Court considered a
asserted fundamental rights. See U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). Although the
contours of the new equal protection-due process analysis are not yet clear, Justice Marshall,
dissenting in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972), best expressed
the direction the Court is likely to take in future cases:
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which constitutionally
guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As
the nexus between the specific [guarantee and interest] . . . draws closer . . . the
degree ofjudicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory
basis must be adjusted accordingly.
Id. at 102-03. The nature of the inquiry the Court makes when faced with an equal protection
problem has significantly shifted in these new cases. In place of the old question concerning
the suspectness of a class or the fundamental nature of a right, the Court now inquires into the
interests of both plaintiff and government. This weighing of the interests determines the
burden both government and plaintiff must meet in litigating the validity of a classification.
Whatever the future of the new due process-equal protection interest-balancing test, it is
important to note that it potentially substitutes the Court'sjudgment for that of the legislature
in cases where traditional equal protection analysis would defer to the legislative decision.
11 See U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972). Women and illegitimates seem to be in this category. The Court, however, has
never held that women are a suspect class for equal protection purposes. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). But statutory distinctions based on sex have in recent years
repeatedly been struck down. See note 73 supra.
" See note 60 supra.
76 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
" See note 73 supra.
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classification made in the food stamp program 8 between unrelated
persons living in a single household and related persons similarly
situated. The Court examined the legislative history of the classifica-
tion and found that the enactment was designed to punish "hippie
communes."7 9 The Court held that this legislative purpose, standing
alone, was impermissible, since it punished individuals for exercis-
ing their rights to association and to privacy. 80 Thus, although the
classification did not directly deny the hippie his fundamental right
of association, it indirectly punished him for exercising that right by
denying him a benefit. Moreno is therefore a classic case of indirect
infringement on a fundamental right. The legislative history of the
LSCA indicates that the only rationale for enacting the challenged
restrictions was to punish those who assert their fundamental right
to privacy, since the right to abortion derives from the right of
privacy, and to desegregated education.81 On this first level, then,
Moreno and the LSCA restrictions stand on similar ground, since in
both cases those who attempt to assert a fundamental right are
punished by the denial of a benefit to which they would otherwise be
entitled.
Faced with a legislative history revealing an impermissible pur-
pose affecting a fundamental right, the Moreno Court examined the
Food Stamp Act to see if some other permissible goal set forth in the
Act was served by the classification. After a lengthy analysis, the
Court concluded that no such goal was served. 82 The LSCA restric-
tions also fail to serve any of the Act's broader stated purposes. 83
78 The section of the Food Stamp Act before the Court was 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970).
79 413 U.S. at 534.
80 Id. at 533-38. Although the majority did not make clear the connection between
the interests that were infringed by the classification and the lack of a legitimate govern-
mental purpose, Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, noted that the classification rode
"roughshod" over the rights of association and privacy, and thus failed to pass constitu-
tional muster under a strict scrutiny test. Id. at 543-44. Nevertheless, the majority opinion
stressed that "hippies" were being indirectly punished for the exercise of their political rights;
hence, from the majority opinion one can conclude that even if fundamental rights are not
directly infringed, indirect restraint for the purpose of punishing the exercise of those rights
is an impermissible governmental activity.
"' See notes 35-37 supra.
82 The Court noted that the goals of the Food Stamp Act could be found in the
congressional declaration of policy prefacing the Act. Examined in light of those purposes, the
Court found that the classification before it was "irrelevant" to an achievement of the goals.
413 U.S. at 534. See note 88 infra.
83 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (Supp. IV, 1974) sets forth the purposes of the Legal Services
Corporation Act. The statement of legislative purpose reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Congress finds and declares that-
(1) there is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice .
(2) there is a need to provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be
otherwise unable to afford [it) ...
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The classifications do not further the LSCA's stated goal of provid-
ing high quality legal service to the poor, since the poor are in fact
denied legal service under the restrictions. 84 Nor do the restrictions
serve to affirm the faith of the poor in a government of laws, 85 since
they are denied government-provided counsel in cases involving
rights held to be fundamental. 86 Finally, even if Congress could
legitimately attempt to depoliticize legal services, it is clear that
Congress could not do so by penalizing those attempting to assert
unpopular rights in court.8 7
The Moreno Court also analyzed the classification before it in
light of other governmental goals not stated in the Food Stamp Act
but nevertheless served by the classification. The Court concluded
that the government had not shown that such classification substan-
tially served any governmental interest and therefore held the clas-
sification invalid under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. 88
Going beyond the stated purposes of the LSCA, the govern-
ment could argue that the classification drawn by the LSCA between
(3) providing legal assistance to those who face an economic barrier... will serve
best the ends of justice;
(4) for many of our citizens the availability of legal services has reaffirmed faith
in our government of laws;
(5) to preserve its strength, the legal services program must be kept free from
the influence of or use by it of political pressures; and
(6) attorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to protect the
best interests of their clients.
The legislative purposes can be broken down into three distinct sets. First, the major
purpose of the Act is to provide legal assistance to the poor, and to provide attorneys with the
resources to defend indigents denied access to the courts. Second, the Act seeks to use legal
services as a method of reaffirming poor people's faith in government. Third, the Act seeks to
depoliticize the legal services program.
84 See notes 24-28 supra.
85 See note 83 supra.
86 See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
87 See notes 79-80 supra.
88 The Court analyzed the supposed relationship between the statute and the gov-
ernmental interest in preventing fraud, holding that "in practical effect, the challenged
classification simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud....
[T]wo unrelated persons living together and meeting all.., conditions [of the statute] would
[be] ... ineligible." 413 U.S. at 537 (emphasis in original). The Court then noted that a simple
alteration in living arrangements would make the parties eligible; hence, the government
could be easily defrauded despite the regulation. The Court professed to be analyzing the
Moreno fact pattern under a traditional rational basis test. Id. at 538. It refused, however, to
accept government assertions of the rationality of the 5tatutory classification at face value;
instead, it undertook an extensive inquiry into actual congressional purposes, which it found
to be illegitimate. This searching inquiry into the relationship between purpose and classifica-
tion is much closer to the type of analysis undertaken in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
than it is to the perfunctory examination undertaken in traditional rational basis cases such as
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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abortion or desegregation cases and other types of litigation serves
the legitimate goal of resource allocation. Although this might be an
effective argument, recent case law suggests that it would fail in the
LSCA context. In Jimenez v. Weinberger,89 the Court considered a
legislative classification that granted benefits to some illegitimates
while denying benefits to others. The Court invalidated the clas-
sification on the grounds that it was irrational and without sufficient
justification under a sliding scale equal protection analysis; the po-
tential for costly claims was as great among the class granted benefits
as among the class denied benefits, and the government failed to
demonstrate any other significant basis for the classification. The
Court distinguished Jimenez from Dandridge v. Williams9" on the
ground thatDandridge involved a significant cost savings to the state,
while inJimenez no such clear-cut savings could be demonstrated. 9'
The LSCA also creates two classes of individuals whose poten-
tial for costly claims is identical. But a client with a costly consumer
claim is given assistance, while a client with an inexpensive abortion
claim is not. Moreover, the Court noted inJimenez that a resource
allocation rationale would validate a classification only if the gov-
ernment could demonstrate that significant dilution of benefits
would result from invalidation of the classification. 92 In light of legal
89 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
"' In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court noted that when economic
and social regulation "not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights" is before the
Court and challenged on due process grounds, the Court will be willing to allow the states wide
latitude in making choices among categories of potential beneficiaries. Id. at 484. Dandridge,
however, is distinguishable from the LSCA situation on two grounds. First, the interest of the
plaintiffs in Dandridge was purely an economc one; they felt that they had been improperly
denied money by the state. In the case of the LSCA restrictions, however, fundamental rights
of privacy and equal protection in schooling are at least threatened, and in such a situation the
Court must balance the legitimate interests of the state against the potential denial of funda-
mental rights. The strength of interests opposing the LSCA restrictions indicates that Dan-
dridge may not be in point. Second, in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), the Court
pointed out thatDandridge required the government to show evidence that allowing appellants
to receive benefits would "significantly impair the federal Social Security trust fund and
necessitate a reduction in the scope of persons benefited by the Act." Id. at 633. Jimenez
therefore indicates that the government must show not only that finite resources must be
rationed, but that the classifications made in rationing significantly serve that end. For an
argument that the LSCA restrictions do not significantly serve to allocated resources see note
92 infra.
91 417 U.S. at 632-34.
92 Id. at 633. For example, there is no evidence in the LSCA legislative history to indicate
that the types of cases that Legal Services attorneys cannot take are extraordinarily costly.
Even if such a rationale were advanced, it does not appear that the government could
demonstrate that these restrictions, if they were lifted, would "significantly impair" the service
provided to other legal aid clients. Id. at 634. These actions might often be handled by other
organizations with greater expertise in these matters. For a list of 31 school desegregation
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services provided by private organizations in abortion and desegra-
tion cases, 93 it appears unlikely that abortion and desegregation
cases would flood legal services offices should the LSCA restrictions
be invalidated. Thus, the inclusion of abortion and desegregation
cases within the scope of LSCA coverage would not result in a
substantial decrease in benefits to LSCA beneficiaries having
nonabortion or nondesegregation claims.94 Because fundamental
rights are affected by the LSCA restrictions, and because the Court
would therefore demand that the government show a significant
governmental interest to support the classification, the LSCA clas-
sifications should be invalidated.
III
POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL
SERVICES ATTORNEYS95
A. Section 2996f(a)(6)
The principal LSCA provision limiting the political activities of
legal services attorneys, section 2996f(a)(6), provides that the Cor-
poration shall
cases taken by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in Virginia between 1954 and 1962 see
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,435 n.16 (1963). The litigative activity of women's and civil
rights groups is well known; thus, even if the restrictions were lifted, the legal services system
would probably not be overburdened with these cases.
Moreover, even if it could be shown that certain desegregation or abortion cases are
costly, the Act does not exclude other costly cases. The Act does not divide the classes of cases
along rational lines of costly cases, which cannot be taken, and routine cases, which may be
taken. Rather, the distinction is arbitrarily drawn between politically unpopular cases, which
may or may not be costly, and all other cases, which also may or may not be costly. Thus, in
practical effect, the statute creates an arbitrary distinction that has little or no relationship to
the allocation of resources rationale often advanced to support statutory restrictions. Unlike
the legislative crassification upheld in Dandridge, which imposed a ceiling on welfare benefits
and thus resulted in a real cost saving to the state, the restrictions of the LSCA do not clearly
serve to place upper limits on Corporation expenditures for litigation. This distinction, like
the distinction between legitimates and illegitimates invalidated inJimenez, will "discriminate
between the two subclasses ... without any basis for the distinction since the potential for
spurious claims is exactly the same as to both subclasses." 417 U.S. at 636.
93 For instance, counsel hired by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund are experienced in the
intricacies of desegregation law. Because of their special commitment to the civil rights cause,
they are also likely to be the best possible advocates for plaintiffs in desegregation cases. At the
least, organizations like the NAACP constitute an alternative vehicle for the institution of such
cases.
, See note 92 supra.
3' This analysis of the restrictions placed on legal services attorneys by LSCA is also
relevant to state and local attempts to regulate the conduct of such attorneys. For example,
according to the judicially established rules of one New York jurisdiction, an attorney working
for any legal aid organization supported by public funds is subject to the Hatch Act (see note
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insure that all attorneys engaged in legal assistance activities sup-
ported in whole or in part by the Corporation refrain, while so
engaged, from-
(A) any political activity, or
(B) any activity to provide voters or prospective voters with
transportation to the polls or provide similar assistance in
connection with an election (other than legal advice and
representation), or
(C) any voter registration activity (other than legal advice and
representation);
and insure that staff attorneys refrain at any time during the
period for which they receive compensation under this subchapter
from the activities described in clauses (B) and (C) of this para-
graph and from political activities of the type prohibited by section
1502(a) of Title 5, whether partisan or nonpartisan .... 96
Because the meaning of this provision is not discernible from its
confusing structure and ambiguous language, reference to legisla-
tive history is essential. Section 2996f(a)(6) embodies two distinct
congressional attempts to depoliticize legal services by restricting the
political activity of legal services attorneys.9 7 For the sake of concep-
tual clarity, one should imagine this provision as being divided into
two parts: part one containing subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), and
part two containing the remainder of the provision, beginning with
ccand insure." The most obvious difference between the two parts is
that the prohibitions of part one affect "all attorneys" engaged in
federally-funded legal assistance activities, whereas the restrictions
of part two only affect staff attorneys, i.e., lawyers who earn at least
fifty percent of their professional income from federally-funded
legal services work.98 The other major distinction involves the time
periods during which these restrictions are in effect. The legislative
history clearly indicates that part one's "while so engaged" covers all
times that attorneys are performing legal services work, that is,
on-duty hours. 99 The restrictions contained in part two, however,
103 infra), and is explicitly precluded from running for office or being "publicly active in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements) any political campaign on behalf of
any candidate." N.Y. App. Div., 1ST DEP'T, R. 608.7(c) (McKinney 1975). Such broad prohi-
bitions raise similar constitutional issues to the LSCA prohibitions. See Boteinsupra note 23, at
754-66. See also Young Lords Party v. Supreme Court of New York, 328 F. Supp. 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), where the New York restrictions were inconclusively challenged.
1-6 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974). In addition, id. § 2996etb)(5) places restric-
tions on the political activity of legal services attorneys during on-duty time, and absolutely
prohibits participation in civil disturbances, activities violative of court injunctions, and "any
other illegal activity" at all times.
"' See note 100 infra.
98 42 U.S.C. § 2996a(7) (Supp. IV, 1974).
" See note 100 infra.
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governing the conduct of staff attorneys "at any time during the
period for which they receive compensation," limits off-duty as well
as on-duty activities. 00
Therefore, all attorneys while on-duty must refrain from "any
political activity"'' 1 and voter transportation and registration activ-
ity. Subsection 2996e(b)(5)(A) of the Act adds picketing, boycotts,
and strikes to the list of prohibited on-duty activities.'0 2 For staff
attorneys, however, the ban on voter transportation and registration
activity extends to off-duty as well as to on-duty periods. The LSCA
further restricts staff attorneys' freedom to participate in commu-
nity affairs during off-duty hours by subjecting staff attorneys to a
portion of the Hatch Act.' 0 3 Moreover, although the Hatch Act itself
100 The preconference version of the LSCA placed restrictions only on legal services
attorneys' on-duty time. Such a limited provision was intended to
insure that all attorneys while engaged in on-time activities refrain from political
activity.... [F]urthermore, attorneys supported by the corporation will fully retain
their first amendment rights to participate in political activities during their office
hours [sic: "office hours" is a misprint of "off-hours"] but such attorneys must refrain
from participating in political activities during the time they are engaged in legal
assistance ....
H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1973). A number of legislators, however, protested
that the ban on political activities needed to be more comprehensive:
The Committee draft is ineffective in that such prohibitions apply only while the
attorney is "on-duty." Presumably, since attorneys are professionals, this would
exclude lunch hours, coffee breaks, and virtually all such situations when such
activity would normally occur. If the program is truly to be independent and free of
politicization, the Administration provision [which included off-duty restrictions]
should be restored.
H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973) (remarks of Representative Landgrebe).
Ultimately, Congress adopted the more restrictive approach. See H.R. REP. No. 1039, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974). The Corporation is currently attempting to clarify the on-duty and
off-duty restrictions via regulation. Section 1608.6(b) of the regulations proposed on May 5,
1976 defines "while so engaged" to include working hours only. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,527-28
(1976).
101 This prohibition invites a vagueness attack. See notes 146-53, 159 and accompanying
text infra.
102 See note 96 supra.
103 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974). The Hatch Act (named for its sponsor, a
New Mexico Senator) was originally enacted in 1939 to prevent employees of the federal
governrent from being coerced by colleagues to support political causes or candidates, and to
insure the political neutrality of federal government service by restricting the political ac-
tivities of federal employees. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147, as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7321-27 (1970). The Act was later extended to cover state employees who derive some
portion of their remuneration from federal sources. Act ofJuly 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767,
as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). And supplementing the Act are
criminal penalties for campaign abuses. 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-617 (Supp. IV, 1974). For a short
history of the Hatch Act see United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413
U.S. 548, 557-63 (1972).
It is important to distinguish the federal employees' branch of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
7321-27 (1970), from the branch regulating state and local employees, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08
(1970 & Supp. IV, 1974), especially since recent legislation has greatly liberalized the political
restrictions on state and local employees. See notes 105-08 and accompanying text infra.
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only regulates partisan political activity, section 2996f(a)(7) applies
the Hatch Act prohibitions so as to restrict staff attorneys' nonparti-
san political activity as well.
B. Off-Duty Political Restrictions on Staff Attorneys
Before the specific off-duty activities prohibited to staff attor-
neys can be ascertained, the version of the Hatch Act currently
incorporated by LSCA section 2996f(a)(6) must be determined. At the
time the LSCA was enacted, section 1502(a) of the Hatch Act prohib-
ited certain public employees from: (1) using their official authority
to interfere with an election; (2) directly or indirectly coercing a
public employee to support a political cause or candidacy; or (3)
taking "an active part in political management or in political cam-
paigns."' 0 4 Three months after the LSCA became law, however,
section 1502(a) of the Hatch Act was substantially amended.10 5 Con-
gress deleted the prohibition against political management and
campaigning, 0 6 and substituted a provision forbidding only candi-
dacy for elective office.' 0 7 Thus, section 1502(a) as amended, is far
more permissive than the version in effect when the LSCA was
enacted. Nevertheless, it is clear that the LSCA draftsmen intended
to place greater limitations on staff attorneys' off-duty political ac-
tivities than merely precluding candidacy for elective office.10 8 This
conflict generates an obvious question: Which version of the Hatch
Act governs for the purposes of LSCA section 2996f(a)(6)? Accord-
ing to generally accepted principles of statutory construction, the
more severe, preamendment terms of Hatch Act section 1502(a)
determine the political restrictions to which staff attorneys are ,sub-
ject.109
Meanwhile, the 94th Congress passed a similar reform of the federal employees portion of the
Hatch Act, H.R. 8617, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), but President Ford vetoed the measure on
April 12, 1976. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1976, at 9, col. 1 (city ed.); id., April 13, 1976, at 28,
col. 2. Since the LSCA incorporates the state and local employees branch of the Hatch Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1970 & Supp IV, 1974), references in this Note to the Hatch Act apply to
that branch.
104 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
105 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending id. (1970).
106 This prohibition had been viewed as the Hatch Act's harshest off-duty political
restriction and had long been the source of considerable controversy. See, e.g., United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548, 596 (1973) (dissenting opinion,
Douglas, J.). See generally Shartsis, The Federal Hatch Act and Related State Cour Trends-A Time
for Change?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1381 (1970).
107 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
108 See H.R. REP. No. 1039, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1974), which specifically lists those
prohibitions intended to be effected by reference to the Hatch Act, including "taking an active
part in . . .political campaigns."
109 A leading treatise on statutory construction explains:
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Therefore, to obtain a sense of the political activities that have
been placed out of bounds for staff attorneys, in the absence of
LSCA regulations," t0 the now superseded regulations implementing
the preamendment version of the Hatch Act should be consulted.'
Permissible political activity under the "old" Hatch Act included
voting in any election," 2 attending political gatherings,113 express-
ing personal opinions privately and publicly on political subjects
and candidates," 4 and contributing to political causes. 1' 5 Among
the political activities prohibited under the "old" Hatch Act were
participating in political fund-raising activities,' 16 endorsing candi-
dates in advertisements,' 1 7 and soliciting votes on behalf of a candi-
date.1' 8 In addition, the "old" Hatch Act regulations indicated that
staff attorneys were precluded from organizing political clubs,11 9
and a fortiori, could not manage campaigns or become candidates
themselves.12 0 Because the LSCA extends such restrictions to parti-
A statute of specific reference incorporates the provisions referred to from the
statute as of the time of adoption without subsequent amendments, unless the
legislature has expressly or by strong implicaton shown its intention to incorporate
subsequent amendments with the statute. In the absence of such intention subse-
quent amendment of the referred statute will have no effect on the reference statute.
2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.08, at 324 (C. Sands ed., 4th ed. 1973).
Courts have invoked this rule of statutory construction in unwaivering tones:
It is well established that, absent a contrary intent of the legislature, the adoption or
incorporation of a statute by reference is an adoption of the law as it existed at the
time the adopting statute was enacted and is unaffected by any subsequent amend-
ment or repeal of the statute adopted.
Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 217 F. Supp. 210, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(citations omitted). The rules of statutory construction distinguish between the incorporation
of specific references, such as the reference to § 1502a of the Hatch Act found in the LSCA,
and general references. If general references are at issue, such as a reference to existing
provisions of federal law or to an act as it may be amended from time to time,. then any
subsequent amendment of the referred statute will become part of the reference statute. 2A
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra, § 51.08, at 324. See Somermeier v. District
Director of Customs, 448 F.2d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. 1971).
10 Although no regulations regarding political restrictions on staff attorneys are cur-
rently in force, such regulations were proposed by the corporation on May 5, 1976. 41 Fed.
Reg. 18,527 (1976). See notes 123, 126 and accompanying text infra.
11 5 C.F.R. §§ 151.101-.123 (1974), as amended, 40 Fed. Reg. 42, 733 (1975). The super-
seded regulations provide a persuasive indication of Congressional intent in subjecting staff
attorneys to the Hatch Act.
112 5 C.F.R. § 151.111(1) (1974).
11 Id. § 151.111(6).
114 Id. § 151.111(2).
115 Id. § 151.111(8).
116 Id. § 151.122(b)(4).
17 Id. § 151.122(b)(10).
118 Id. § 151.122(b)(7).
129 Id. § 151.122(b)(2).120 Id. § 151.122(b)(6).
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san and nonpartisan political activities, the broad sweep of'the politi,
cal restrictions imposed upon staff attorneys becomes'apparent. For
example, a staff attorney on his own time will be precluded from
organizing nonpartisan clubs devoted to a diversity of "poliidal"
causes, from local school improvement to pacifism.
Outside organizations have proposed LSCA regulations "that
incorporate the new, more permissive version of the Hatch Act.1 21
Under these proposals, a staff attorney would only be prohibited
from becoming a candidate for public office.12 2 Should the Legal
Services Corporation adopt this view,1 23 Congressmen whose sup-
port of the LSCA was based in part upon its severe political restric-
tions are likely to be antagonized. 2 4 In addition to expressing'dis-
pleasure during appropriation hearings, Congressmen may avail
themselves of more formal fneans of challenging liberal interpreta-
tion of these restrictions.1 25
Nevertheless, permissive interpretation of section 2996f(a)(6) is
less constitutionally suspect than restrictive interpretation. Perhaps a
court will therefore choose the less restrictive version in oIrder to
12, Office of Legal Services Transition Committee, Proposed Regulations for Legal
Services Corporation § 40, at 7, (July 9, 1975); The Umbrella Group of Interested Organiza-
tions, Proposed Regulations for the Legal Services Corporation § 530-2 to-3 (June 9, 1975).
(Both on file at the Cornell Law Review).
122 See proposed regulations cited in note 121 supra.
123 The regulations proposed by the Corporation regarding political restrictions follow
the new, amended version of the Hatch Act. Proposed Regulations for the Legal Services
Corporation Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 18,527 (1976). 5 U.S.C. §§ 1502(a)(l)-(2) (Supp. IV, 1974) are
tracked in §§ 1608.5(a)-(b); 5 U.S.C, § 1502(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974) is extended to nonpartisan
candidacy in § 1608.5(c), to reflect 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
The Corporation may justify this interpretation by stressing that § 2996f(a)(6) merely
requires the Corporation to ensure that staff attorneys refrain from political activity "ofthe type
prohibited by section 1502(a) [of the Hatch Act] ...." (Emphasis added.) Thus the Corpora-
tion may argue that this reference to the Hatch Act is not specific, but rather indicates a
congressional intention that the Corporation use the Hatch Act as an instructive but nonman-
datory guide in formulating its own regulations. Nonetheless, it may be questioned whether
these regulations conform to the Act itself, in light of the legislative history. There can be no
doubt, however, that the Corporation's interpretation is more consistent with the Constitution.
See note 126 infra.
124 Indeed, proponents of the restrictions have declared that they will pay close attention
to LSCA regulations. An aide to Senator Helms explained: "We want to make sure that they
don't accomplish by regulation what they failed to accomplish by legislation." Arnold, And
Finally, 342 Days Later .... JuRis Do(:rOR, Sept. 1975, at 32-33.
123 Congressmen could seek a ruling from the Comptroller General that any expenditure
of funds in accordance with permissive regulations violates legislative intent and is therefore
illegal. The authority of the Comptroller General to determine the propriety of federal
expenditures is set forth and discussed in Fischer, Presidential Spending Discretion and Congres-
sional Controls, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 169-70 (1972). There is even authority
allowing Congressmen to challenge in court such violations of the legislative mandate. See
Note, Congress and the Executive: The Role f the Courts, 11 HARV. J. LEGIs. 352 (1972).
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interpret the LSCA in conformity with the Constitution.12 6 How-
ever, in light of the clarity with which Congress voiced its restrictive
intention, a court would be precluded by accepted principles of
statutory construction from adopting an interpretation so contrary
to the legislative intent. 127
IV
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS
ON LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION ATTORNEYS
The LSCA restricts in varying degrees the political activity of
full and part-time attorneys working on programs supported by the
Corporation. 128 Although Congress expressed little doubt as to the
constitutionality of these limitations, 129 analysis reveals that they are
vulnerable to constitutional attack under the first amendment and
the due process clause.
A. General Approach
Congress has broad authority to set terms and conditions of
government employment. An exercise of such power is usually ana-
lyzed under a rational basis standard. 30 The rational bases that can
126 The Corporation's proposed regulations, see note 123 supra, embody the concept that
the required political restrictions be as liberal as possible, while still preserving the neutrality
of the LSC. This concept has often been adopted by the courts when reviewing governmental
infringement of constitutional rights. Therefore the Corporation's regulations are less vulner-
able to constitutional attack than would be regulations incorporating the old, preamendment
version of the Hatch Act.
127 "[O]ur task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the
will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations." United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973).
128 See note 13 supra.
121) The only serious questioning of the constitutionality of these political restrictions
came from the floor of the House on June 21, 1973.
These sections also seriously infringe on the attorneys' first amendment rights by
declaring that they may not participate in activities such as picketing, boycotts and
strikes.... The constitutionality of these provisions is questionable especially in light
of Judge Gesell's opinion in last year's District of Columbia District Court case
declaring the Hatch Act violative of the constitution. [The reference is to the district
courtLetter Carriers decision, which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court;
see text accompanying notes 181-83 infra.]
119 CONG. REc. 20,702 (1973) (remarks of Representative Abzug).
I believe the amendment [imposing broad restrictions on staff attorneys] to be
unconstitutional, because I think it takes away rights of these people which are rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and which they do not give up because they become
Legal Service attorneys.
Id. at 20,741 (remarks of Representative Meeds). See generally id. at 20,706-07 (remarks of
Representative Drinan); id. at 20,708-09 (remarks of Representative Lehman). See also note
169 infra.
..0 In United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,101 (1947), the Court noted that:
1976] DEPOLITICIZING LEGAL AID
be advanced to support LSCA restrictions on attorney political activ-
ity include the perceived needs (1) to ensure attorney efficiency and
concentration on Corporation matters,1 31 (2) to minimize Corpora-
tion vulnerability to political influences, 132 and (3) to avoid iden-
tification of the Corporation with political controversy. 33 Because
these provisions infringe first amendment rights of political expres-
sion and association, however, they must meet a higher standard of
scrutiny.' 34
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the government
has a greater interest in regulating the first amendment rights of its
employees than the rights of other citizens, 35 the Court has care-
fully noted that the government does not have the constitutional
prerogative of imposing unlimited restrictions on political activity
as a condition of government employment. 36 Rather, the Court
[flor regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything
more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of
the public service.
See also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548, 596-97
(1973) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.).
M3' See 119 CONG. REC. 41,460 (1973) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
1 "The Congress finds and declares that-.., to preserve its strength, the legal services
program must be kept free from the influence of or use by it of political pressures .... " 42
U.S.C. § 2996(5) (Supp. IV, 1974).
133 Employees of the Corporation or of recipients shall not at any time inten-
tionally identify the Corporation or the recipient with any partisan or nonpartisan
political activity associated with a political party or association, or the campaign of any
candidate for public or party office.
Id. § 2996e(e)(1).
"I In discussing the Hatch Act prohibitions on government employee participation in
political management and campaigns, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970), the Supreme Court has
stated: "Thus we have a measure of interference by the Hatch Act ... with what otherwise
would be the freedom of the civil servant under the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments."
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947). The Court's observation merely
reaffirmed the established principle that "[o]ur form of government is built on the premise
that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association. This
right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights." Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). The Court has, however, held that certain forms of government
employee partisan political conduct are not protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973).
1 In Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), the Court emphasized that
"the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general."
"' "We have said that Congress may regulate the political conduct of government em-
ployees 'within reasonable limits,' even though the regulation trenches to some extent upon
unfettered political action." United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947)." '[T]he
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any
conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.'" Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967), quoting the Second Circuit's opinion, 345 F.2d
236, 239 (1965). See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), for the application
of Keyishian to first amendment rights of expression.
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generally tests applied limitations on employee political rights by
balancing the individual's interest in the right against the gov-
ernmental interest in the restriction. 137 For a statute constitu'tio hally
to restrict such first amendment rights, a showing of compelling
state interest is required.13 8 Furthermore, because equal protection
37 In United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947), the Supreme Court
stated: "Again this Court must balance tlhe extent of the" guarantees of freedom against a
congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the supposed evil of political
partisanship by classified enployees of government." Although the Court thus purported to
use a balancing test in Mitchell, some commentators have suggested that the test actually
applied was one of reasonalleness. See Comment, The Hatch Act-A Constitutional Restraint of
Preedom?, 33 ALBANY L. REV. 345,349-50 (1969); Note, PoliticalActivity and the Public Employee:
A Sufficient Cause for Dismissal?, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 736, 744 (1970). Whether the Mitchell Court
is seen td have actually carried out a balancing test, or not, it is clear that balancing is now the
preferred mode of evalt'atitig political restrictions applied to government employees. See
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 US. 548, 564-67 (1973);
Alderman v. Philadelphid Housing Authority, 496 F.2d 164, 173 (3d Cir.), tert. deniied, 419
U.S. 844 (1974); Magill v. Lynch, 400 F. Supp. 84, 92 (D.R.I, 1975); Phillips v. City of Flint, 57
Mii'. A0p. 394, 995 N.W(.2d 780 (1975). This balancing approach was definitively established
in Pickefiig V. Boartd of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968), where the Court held the dismissal of
a public school ieacher for exercising his first amendment rights to be unconstitutional.
Moreover, interest balancing has received new vitality from the Supreme Court's recent
review of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (2 U.S.C. §§ 431-42, 18
U.S.C. §§ 608-17, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13 (Supp. Vt 1974)):
We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior
decisions, the weighty interests served by restrictifig the size of financial contributions
to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amend-
ment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.
Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612, 640 (1976). '
If a facial overbreadth attack were launched against the attorney political restrictions,
however, a balancing analysis would probably not be employed by the courts. See note 162
infra; Note, Overbreadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 532 (1974). The Warren
Court explicitly disavowed the balancing approach in facial overbreadth cases and instead
adopted a potent absolutist position which invalidated any statute effecting a significant chill
on first amendment rights, regardless of the countervailing governmental interests in the
regulation. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967); Note 49 N.Y.U,L. REV.,
supra, at 535. There have been occasional signs that the Burger Court may be moving towards
a balancing approach to facial overbreadth. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972); Note, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV., supra, at 540-41. The Court recently affirmed summarily,
however, a district court decision which appears to reject the balancing approach to facial
overbreadth and recognize "that despite any legitimate state interest involved, the chilling
effect on protected expression is too high a price to pay when the regulatory scheme has not
been narrowly drawn." Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mem.,
96 S. Ct. 763 (1976). Thus the role of interest balancing as a part of the facial overbreadth
doctrine is subject to considerable doubt.
' See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406
(1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 555 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
Some commentators have described an evolution in the Court's analysis of restrictions on
employee first amendment rights. In United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), the
Court is seen to have invoked a reasonableness or rational nexus approach which has now
given way to a compelling state interest test. See Minge, Federal Restrictions on the Political
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violations are suggested by subjecting the fundamental rights of
certain attorneys to unusually restrictive regulation, an even st ricter
first amendment standard may apply to these prohibitions.'? 9 Even
where limitations on political activity are constitutionally permissi-
ble, they must be narrowly drawn.140
Application of a b ancing test may invalidate specific LSCA
political restrictions on attorneys. Although the Supreme Court, in
scrutinizing Hatch Ac,t political limitations on ,civil servants, 'has
struck the balance in favor of compelling governmental interests,
the Court has left open -the possibility that more restrictive xegula-
tion might tip the scales in favor of the individual's 'first amendment
rights.1 41 In fact, governmental interests at stake junder the 1SCA
are less compelling xthan those involved in the Hatch Act. Although
-the government has a legitimate interest in controlling its own
,employees, that interest .decreases as the employment relationship
attenuates from civil servant, to federal corporation employee, ,to
government contractor employee. Certainly governmental interests
in controlling the political behavior of employees ,of a corporation
intended to be independent of the federal bureaucracy14 2 are less
than governmental interests in regulating its ow-n employee&4 3
Since the LSCA limitations on attorney political activity are more
restrictive than those Hatch Act provisions that survived first
amendment challenge, the courts may invalidate the application of
certain LSCA limitations as violative of the first amendment, and
may do so without overruling-the established line of cases-upholding
the Hatch Act.
B. On-Duty Restrictions
Legal Services Corporation attorneys, whether full or part-.time,
are subject to on-duty limitations on their political activity.' 44 Section
Activities f State and Local Employees, 57 MINN. L. REv. 493, 530-35 (1978). Whether this
currently evolving theory or the balancing theory is the chosen perspective, the result is the
same-the Court-now requires a compelling state interest to justify limitations-onoinstitution-
ally protected political activities.
23:9 For discussion of the equal protection-first amendment interface see notes 178,
196-200 and accompanying text infra.
240 The Court has emphasized that first amendment rights are "delicate and vulnerable'
and "need breathing space to survive." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 483 (1963).
24M See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548 (197,3);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
242 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
143 Analyzed from this perspective, the proposed repeal of the Hatch Act asapplied to
federal employees produces the ,anomalous result that LSC attorneys are subject to substan-
tially greater political restriction than are federal civil servants. See note 403 aupra.
244 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6) (Sup'p. IV, 1974).
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2996f(a)(6) places a general restriction on "any political activity"' 45
and specific restrictions on election 146 and voter registration 147 ac-
tivities. These prohibitions, which apparently apply to both partisan
and nonpartisan conduct, reflect congressional concern that attor-
neys engage only in legal services matters during periods for which
they are being paid by the Corporation. Because on-duty behavior is
more likely to have an impact on job performance, the government
has a stronger interest in regulating the use of on-duty time than it
has in regulating the use of off-duty time. Nevertheless, an argu-
ment can be made that Congress has run afoul of the Constitution in
imposing these restrictions on Corporation attorneys.
The most constitutionally suspect on-duty' restriction is that
which forbids attorneys from engaging in "any political activity."
Although it is apparent that Congress enacted this provision in
reaction to scattered reports that OEO legal services attorneys were
engaging in political activity during office hours, 48 the scope of the
provision is not clear. It could be construed to apply to a very large
or to a relatively small spectrum of activity. Because "men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. . . , "4 there
is substantial doubt as to the constitutionality of the restriction under
the due process vagueness doctrine. Arguably, the phrase "any
political activity" offends three of the "important values"'150 that the
vagueness doctrine seeks to protect. 5' First, it fails to provide ade-
quate warning to the citizenry of what conduct is proscribed. 52
Second, it fails to set explicit standards for application of the law to
avoid "arbitrary and discriminatory" enforcement.' 5 3 Third, the
ambiguity of the provision exerts a chilling effect upon the free
4'5 Id. § 2996f(a)(6)(A).
,-n Id. § 2996f(a)(6)(B).
141 Id. § 2996f(a)(6)(C).
141 See 120 CONG. REC. S 808-09 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Helms).
141 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
150 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
151 Although vagueness and facial overbreadth are theoretically distinct doctrines, there
are close parallels between the two doctrines as applied to first amendment rights. See Note,
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 871-75 (1970). Both analyses
seek to remedy chilling effects on fundamental rights and curb excessive official discretion in
applying statutes restricting protected activity. Therefore, it is not surprising that judicial
analysis of the two doctrines is often blurred within a single case. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972); Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'dmem., 96
S. Ct. 763 (1976). The one discernable difference between the two doctrines in the first
amendment arena is that a "hard core" plaintiff may invoke the rights of third parties under
facial overbreadth but not under vagueness. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See also notes
137 supra and 160-62 infra.
152 Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
.3 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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exercise of first amendment rights.1 54 The Supreme Court has held
that statutes affecting such rights will be subject to particularly
rigorous vagueness scrutiny.155
For many years the Hatch Act and state and local counterparts
(mini-Hatch Acts) have been unsuccessfully attacked under the vague-
ness doctrine.1 56 The statutes that have been upheld, however,
used uniformly more precise language than "any political activity,"
and were supported by regulations and agency or court interpreta-
tions that helped to clarify the restrictions. 157 To date, there have
been no regulations promulgated to clarify the meaning of "any
political activity,"'158 and regulations proposed by interested outside
groups do little to alleviate the vagueness of the provision. 59 Al-
though the Supreme Court has shown some recent hostility toward
the vagueness doctrine, 60 this provision of the LSCA could suc-
' Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
i And this Court has intimated that stricter standards of permissible statutory
vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on
speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free
dissemination of ideas may be the loser.
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (Los Angeles ordinance forbidding possession of
indecent writings held unconstitutional).
'56 See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548 (1973);
State n, rel. Gonzalesv. Manzagol, 87 N.M. 230, 531 P.2d 1203 (1975).
157 For example, in Letter Carriers, the majority relied heavily upon a "complex network"
of Civil Service Commission regulations to uphold the Hatch Act. 413 U.S. at 571-74. See also
the conflict between Justice White's majority opinion and Justice Brennan's dissent in Broad-
rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), as to whether or not interpretations by the State
Personnel Board and the State Attorney General provided sufficient definition to an Ok-
lahoma statute, prohibiting political activity by state civil servants, to defeat a vagueness attack.
Id. at 617-18, 623-27.
'58 Regulations were issued by the Corporation on September 12, 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 42,
362 (1975), and on May 5, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 18,527 (1976), but they shed no light upon the
meaning of "any political activity." It therefore appears that the Corporation is consciously
refraining from defining this troublesome statutory phrase.
159 The Umbrella Group Proposed Regulations, see notes 121-22 and accompanying text
supra, do not attempt to define "any political activity." The Office of Legal Services Proposed
Regulations, see notes 121-22 and accompanying text supra, by merely tracking the LSCA
statutory language also fail to clarify the provision. Although it can be argued that the Hatch
Act and its implementing regulations should be regarded as persuasive authority for clarifying
"any political activity," it would be difficult to explain why Congress failed to incorporate the
Hatch Act by reference, as it did with off-duty provisions, if it intended that Act to define the
scope of LSCA on-duty restrictions. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
160 In Letter Carriers, the Court emphasized the "limitations in the English language with
respect to being both specific and manageably brief" in rejecting a vagueness challenge to the
Hatch Act. 413 U.S. at 578-79. In Rose v. Locke, 96 S. Ct. 243 (1975), the Court recently
rejected a vagueness attack on a Tennessee "crime against nature" statute. Litigants seeking to
invoke the vagueness doctrine will also encounter standing problems. The Court has made it
clear that "hard core" plaintiffs, those to whom the statute clearly and validly applies, will not
be heard to attack the statute on vagueness grounds. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
In'Rose, however, the Court recognized that a higher standard of vagueness scrutiny applies
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cumb, to- a, vagueness attack unless the Corporation, promulgates
adequate clarifying regulations.
Ia. addition, absent -narrowing regulation, this general restric-
tion may be applied to a broad range of traditionally protected
activity an. thus my be susceptible to standard first amendment
challenge,, For example,, the restriction could be invqked to forbid
legal services. attorneys from wearing political buttons or driving
cars, displaying political, bumper stickers. Although such political
expression- has little effect on an attorney's job, performance, he has
a, basic intere..st in such activity. If a, cour were to balance the
governmental need for the restrictipn, against, the individual's ipter-
est in the activiy, the individual would likely prevail., Thus a court
could e asily find-a specific application of the "any political activity"
prohibition, to. be an unconstitutional infriijgement upon first
amendment rights under a traditional, "as applied," first amend-
ment a alysis. BRcause the Corporation may be reluctant to enforce
the At against- such marginal behavior as political buttons and
bump-er stickers, however, the alternative firs.t amendment facial
overbreadth, doctrine might be invoked. 16' Although the phrase
"(any political actiyity" invites facial overbreadth, an.alysis, that theory
would, likely fail because the Burger Court has been resistant to such
claims.s 62
where fundamental rights are involved. 96 S. Ct. at 244 n.3. It is apparent from cases like
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (Georgia breach of peace statute unconstitutionally
vague), that the vagueness doctrine remains vital in the first amendment arena.
"' For a general comparison of "as applied" and "facial overbreadth" first amendment
scrutiny, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV., L. REv. 844 (1970).See
also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-16 (1,973).
1"2 Under, facal overbreadth reasoning, a litigant to whom a statute is constitutionally
applied may attack theoretically unconstitutional applications of the statute to theoretical
parties-the fiacial overbreadth doctrine being an exception to established standing concepts
invoked in first~amendment i ases. The rationale for the doctrine is the necessity of avoiding
chilling effects on fundamental first amendment rights. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 486-87 (1965). The Burger Court, however, has cut back on the special treatment
afforded- first amendment litigants and has shown specifiq hostility toward the facial over-
breadth doctrine. See, e.g., Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 141-53
(1973); Note, Overbreadth Review and The Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 532 (1974). The
Court appears to be fashioning a new facial overbreadth doctrine by imposing the ambiguous
requirement that "pirticularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe
that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973Y.
Although the exact meaning ofJustice White's majority opinion in Broadrick is not clear, it
is evident that the Burger Court seeks to render the facial overbreadth doctrine at once less
accessible and less potent. See generally Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1975)
(facial overbreadth must be both real and substantial); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
815-18. (1975), (availability of facial overbreadth doctrine may depend upon proportion of
speech to conduct regulated); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (Court may
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The other two on-duty restrictions, those limiting election and
voter registration activitites, seem immune to constitutional attack.
These provisions merely prohibit attorneys from using on-duty
hours to promote political causes by transporting voters to the polls
or by encouraging voter registration. In balancing the governmental
and individual interests affected by these restrictions, the govern-
ment would probably prevail. Significantly, an exception to the
prohibition permits attorneys to advise and represent clients in
election and voter registration matters.1 63
C. Off-Duty Restrictions
In addition to the on-duty restrictions imposed on all Corpora-
tion attorneys, the LSCA also requires staff attorneys 64 to limit their
off-duty partisan and nonpartisan political activities.165 Staff attor-
neys are specifically prohibited from engaging in partisan and non-
partisan election and voter registration activities during off-duty
hours. 166 In addition, the Act incorporates by reference the prohib-
itions contained in section 1502(a) of the Hatch Act.' 67
Off-duty restrictions are more difficult to justify than the on-duty
restrictions previously examined. What an attorney does during his
off hours is only of consequence to the Corporation to the extent
that off-duty conduct affects on-duty performance.16 8 Although a
resort to balancing of interests affected by statute). See also 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640 (1976).
Although the Burger Court is apparently transforming the facial overbreadth doctrine, the
current vitality of the doctrine, in some form, has been recognized by seven of the sitting
justices. See EMERSON, HABNER, & DORSIN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1246-47 (1976). Thus the facial overbreadth doctrine is currently in a state of
flux.
16 The exceptions create loopholes in the prohibitions which arguably allow attorneys to
engage in a wide range of election and voter registration activities under the guise of advice or
representation. This is but one example of what critics in Congress called "illusory prohib-
itions," which
give the appearance of being addressed to some of the notorious abuses of the
present program [OEO] but which are actually calculated to perpetuate some of the
worst of these abuses and, in some instances, to pave the way for new and more
imaginative outrages to be committed. The general pattern in the examples which
follow is to set forth language which appears to be prohibitory but then to provide for
a qualifying phrase or exception which renders the apparent prohibition ineffective
or "inoperative."
119 CONG. REc. 20,704 (1973) (remarks of Representative Rousselot).
164 For a definition of staff attorney, see note 13 supra.
16' 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
166 Id. Staff attorneys may not participate in partisan or nonpartisan election and voter
registration activities at any time. This section of the Note, however, focuses only upon staff
attorney off-duty restrictions. For a discussion of on-duty political restrictions, see notes
142-63 and accompanying text supra.
I6 See notes 103-20 and accompanying text supra.
168 As Justice Douglas stated in his dissenting opinion in United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548, 597 (1973):
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few liberal Congressmen expressed concern that the off-duty pro-
hibitions might be more vulnerable to constitutional attack than the
on-duty restrictions, 169 congressional debate was influenced by fear
that "movement lawyers" would capitalize on the ambiguity between
a professional's on and off-duty hours to play politics on Corpora-
tion time.' 70 The off-duty provision may also have been an attempt
to drive such attorneys out of the federally-sponsored legal ser-
vices program.
The substance of the Hatch Act incorporation into the LSCA
depends upon which version of the Hatch Act controls.' 71 If the
"old" Hatch Act applies, then stricter regulation of attorney off-duty
conduct is required; if the "new" Hatch Act applies, then more
lenient regulation results. In either event, it is significant that despite
similarities between Hatch Act and LSCA off-duty provisions, the
latter are more restrictive than the former in that they reach non-
partisan as well as partisan conduct.' 72 Thus, a constitutional chal-
lenge to these off-duty restrictions' would not necessarily be re-
ndered futile by the line of cases upholding the off-duty partisan
restrictions of the Hatch Act.' 73 The constitutionality of these provi-
sions will be examined under the first amendment, initially assuming
But it is of no concern of Government what an employee does in his spare time,
whether religion, recreation, social work, or politics is his hobby-unless what he does
impairs efficiency or other facets of the merits of his job. Some things, some activities
do affect or may be thought to affect the employee's job performance. But his
political creed, like his religion, is irrelevant. In the areas of speech, like religion, it is
of no concern what the employee says in private to his wife or to the public in
Constitution Hall.
,69 Congress was not persuaded by Representative Drinan's opinion that
[a] lawyer's life is a busy one, and it is difficult to tell when he or she is acting "while
engaged in-Legal Services-activities." While it would be blatantly unconstitutional
to prohibit Legal Services attorneys from engaging in political activity on their own
tie,, the several questions raised by the broad prohibitive language of section 6(b) (5)
are so fraught with first amendment difficulties as to make me extremely doubtful of
the advisability and constitutionality of this part of this legislation.
119 CONG. REc. 20,706 (1973) (emphasis added).
170 See id. at 20,704-05 (remarks of Representative Rousselot); 120 CONG. REC. S 808-
09 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Helms). See also note 100 supra.
,7, See notes 103-09 and accompanying text supra.
172 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974) requires the Corporation to ensure that staff
attorneys refrain "from political activities of the type prohibited by section 1502(a) of Title 5,
whether partisan or nonpartisan . (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974)). Subsections 1502(a)(l)-(2), dealing with the use of authority to affect
election or nomination results and with the use of coercion to encourage political contribu-
tions, apply equally to partisan and nonpartisan behavior. Subsection 1502(a)(3), however,
dealing with political management and campaigns (or simply candidacy in the new version),
applies only to partisan activity. Because § 1502(a)(3) is certainly the most controversial and
restrictive provision in the Hatch Act, it is particularly significant that the LSCA broadens the
scope of that provision to reach nonpartisan conduct.
,' See notes 184-85 and accompanying text infra.
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incorporation of the "old" Hatch Act, followed by an analysis assum-
ing incorporation of the "new" Hatch Act.
1. The "Old" Hatch Act Incorporated into the LSCA
According to established principles of statutory construction,
section 2996f(a)(6) incorporates the old version of the Hatch Act.' 74
This incorporation gives rise to a wide range of off-duty restric-
tions' 7 1 that are vulnerable to constitutional attack under the first
amendment and perhaps under a due process-equal protection
analysis.
Off-duty restrictions infringe upon first amendment rights of
political expression and association. 176 As such, their application
gives rise to immediate constitutional suspicion and can only be
upheld by a showing that compelling governmental interest in the
prohibitions outweighs individual interest in the rights.' 7 7 These
restrictions may, in fact, be subject to stricter scrutiny than is usual in
first amendment cases because they apply only to a particular group,
staff attorneys, arguably on account of their political beliefs.' 78
174 See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
17' See text accompanying notes 112-20 supra.
176 See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
177 See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
M78 As is discussed in the text accompanying notes 196-200 infra, the LSCA singles out
staff attorneys for particularly restrictive treatment and touches upon the fundamental first
amendment right of political expression. The LSCA legislative history reveals that such
restrictive regulation may have been imposed upon staff attorneys to curb the radical political
sympathies that group demonstrated under the OEO Legal Services Program. See, e.g., 120
CONG. REc. S 809-23 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Helms).
This line of analysis suggests two due process-equal protection violations. First, the fifth
amendment is violated by a classification affecting fundamental rights. See note 61 and accom-
panying text supra. Second, the sliding-scale due process-equal protection requirement is
violated by the special treatment of staff attorneys, which cannot bejustified under the stated
purposes of the LSCA, but can only be explained by the demonstrated congressional intent to
muzzle a politically unpopular group of attorneys. For a discussion of the sliding-scale due
process-equal protection analysis see note 73 supra.
The suggestion of due process-equal protection violations may also require that the
off-duty provisions be subjected to a stricter first amendment analysis. The Supreme Court
has implied on several occasions that the applicable first amendment standard may depend
upon whether legislation affects groups or political viewpoints in an unequal manner. For
example, in upholding Oklahoma's mini-Hatch Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (1972),
the Court stated: "Additionally, overbreadth scrutiny has generally been somewhat less rigid
in the context of statutes regulating conduct in the shadow of the First Amendment, but doing
so in a neutral, noncensorial manner." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,614 (1973). The
Court continued:
But at the same time, § 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular groups or
viewpoints. Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, [385 U.S. 589 (1969)]. The statute,
rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As




Thus the governmental interest supporting the restrictions
must be compelling in order to survive challenge.1 79 The essence of
that interest would be a need to ensure that legal services are deliv-
ered efficiently and without political bias. The off-duty aspect of the
prohibitions might also be justified (1) on the basis of the difficulty of
distinguishing between a lawyer's on and off-duty hours, 181 (2) on
the theory that off-duty political activities may genuinely interfere
with an attorney's ability to work on-duty, and (3) on the assumption
that off-duty activity may tarnish the neutral identity of the Corpo-
ration and thus limit its effectiveness. In support of its case, the
government could point to the analysis established in United Public
Workers of America v. Mitchell,' 81 and "unhesitatingly reaffirmed" in
United States Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers Union 81 which
held that the "old" Hatch Act prohibitions on political management
and campaigning were "sustainable by the obviously important
interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political
activities now contained in the Hatch Act."'1 83 Although these Hatch
Act cases would necessarily be persuasive, they would not be disposi-
tive.
The Hatch Act cases involved statutory provisions substantially
less restrictive than the LSCA. The controversial political manage-
ment and campaigning prohibition upheld in both Mitchell and Letter
Carriers did not expressly apply to nonpartisan activities.' 84 There-
fore, the leading Supreme Court cases in this area have not ad-
dressed the type of nonpartisan provision contained in the LSCA.
The Court in both Mitchell and Letter Carriers was careful to note that
"[i]t is only partisan political activity that is interdicted.' ' 8 5 Cases like
Broadrick v. Oklahoma' 86 indicate that the Court may have been
studiously avoiding the difficult matter of nonpartisan limitations 87
Id. at 616. See alo United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers Union, 413 U.S. 548,
564 (1973).
179 See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
'" See notes 100, 170 and accompanying text supra.
81 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
182 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973).
113 Id. at 564.
184 See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
5 330 U.S. at 100; 413 U.S. at 556, quoting 330 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added). Through-
out the majority opinion in Letter Carriers, the adjective "partisan" conspicuously qualified the
Court's endorsement of the Hatch Act political restrictions.
186 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
187 In Broadrick, state employee plaintiffs conceded the validity of partisan political
restrictions as applied, but challenged the Oklahoma statutory scheme as overbroad in its
effect on nonpartisan activities. The Court, however, refused to address the nonpartisan
claim, avoiding difficult constitutional questions by holding that the plaintiffs did not have
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Regulation of nonpartisan conduct is problematic because it is not
related to the concerns of party influence and loyalty central to
governmental rationalization of purely partisan restrictions. Argu-
ably, the Court's avoidance of the nonpartisan question is some
indication that it considers such restriction unconstitutional. In addi-
tion, lower federal courts and state supreme courts have held non-
partisan provisions virtually per se unconstitutional. 188 Under this
analysis, the LSCA nonpartisan provisions would be automatically
invalidated.
Even if the nonpartisan restrictions were not deemed invalid
per se, the off-duty prohibitions might be vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack. Several courts have recently rejected the per se ap-
proach as an analysis founded upon formalistic distinctions between
standing to raise the claim and that the state agencies had interpreted the statute as inapplica-
ble to nonpartisan matters. In Phillips v. City of Flint, 57 Mich. App. 394, 225 N.W.2d 780 (2d
Div. 1975), the Michigan Court of Appeals examined a city charter restriction on city employ-
ees and stated:
Our reading of Broadrick, Letter Carriers and UPW v. Mitchell convinces us that the
Supreme Court has never definitively ruled on whether nonpartisan political ac-
tivities of public employees can be constitutionally proscribed. In each case, the law
upheld by the Court proscribed only partisan activity.
Id. at 403,225 N.W.2d at 784. See also Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 496 F.2d 164,
183 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Magill v. Lynch, 400 F. Supp. 84 (D.R.I. 1975).
188 In holding unconstitutional a Philadelphia Housing Authority memorandum that
forbade employees from discussing an upcoming tenant plebiscite, the Third Circuit stated:
"We think, however, that Broadrick and Letter Carriers, properly viewed, carve out carefully
circumscribed exceptions to the sweeping injunction of the First Amendment, exceptions
allowing a legislature-Congress or state law makers-to inhibit only 'partisan political activity'
not all political 'discussion."' Alderman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 496 F.2d 164, 172 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (emphasis in original). Similarly, while striking down
Ohio state and local restrictions on police political activities, a federal judge stated: "(T]he
position taken by this Court is that the Hatch Act limitations sanctioned by the Supreme Court
in Mitchell represent the outermost limitation to which any governmental body may restrict the
political activities and free speech of its employees." Gray v. Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281, 1286
(N.D. Ohio 1971).
Several state courts have found mini-Hatch Acts to be unconstitutionally overbroad,
largely because of nonpartisan political provisions. See, e.g., Kinnear v. San Francisco, 61 Cal.
2d 341, 392 P.2d 391, 38 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1964); De Stefano v. Wilson, 96 N.J. Super. 592, 233
A.2d 682 (L. Div. 1967); Minielly v. Oregon, 242 Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966). Most of these
state cases, however, were decided in the interval between Mitchell (1947) and Letter Carriers
(1973). As such, they illustrate a theory that gained currency during that interval: that
intervening first amendment cases like NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), had eroded the holding of Mitchell. See, e.g., Fort v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964). This theory was rejected by
the Court in Letter Carriers, leaving the earlier state court decisions of questionable preceden-
tial value. There is some indication that state courts are now retreating in light of Letter
Carriers. See Boston Police Patrol Ass'n, Inc. v. Boston, 326 N.E.2d 314 (1975). Letter Carriers
has not, however, deterred some state courts from overturning nonpartisan political restric-
tions. See Phillips v. City of Flint, 57 Mich. App. 394, 225 N.W.2d 780 (2d Div. 1975).
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partisan and nonpartisan activity.1 8 9 It has been suggested that the
preferred inquiry is whether or not the prohibition actually pro-
motes employment efficiency and impartiality. 190 If so, then a first
amendment balancing test would be invoked. 191 Under this alterna-
tive approach, the LSCA off-duty restrictions would be at least
constitutionally suspect. Some prohibited conduct, such as taking
part in a nonpartisan school board campaign, would appear to have
little or no effect on a staff attorney's ability to perform legal services
work. On balance, the individual's interest in such conduct would
probably prevail. Any job-related political restrictions that are jus-
tifiable would have to be regulated by a more narrowly drawn
provision. 192
This first amendment argument is strengthened when the
LSCA political restrictions are viewed in their entirety. One of the
rationales used by the Supreme Court to uphold the Hatch Act was
the existence of numerous outlets for political expression which
remained unfettered under the statute. 93 The LSCA permits a staff
attorney only very limited means of political expression under a
regime of broad on and off-duty limitations. 94 Thus, under either
a per se or a balancing analysis, the off-duty restrictions as incorpo-
rated into the LSCA by the "old" Hatch Act are vulnerable to first
amendment attack.' 95
There are also indications of due process-equal protection viola-
tions throughout the LSCA political restrictions. The statute sets up
numerous classifications: (1) legal services attorneys and the rest of
189 In Phillips v. City of Flint, 57 Mich. App. 394, 403, 225 N.W.2d 780, 784 (2d Div.
1975), the court stated: "We feel that dividing political activities of public employees into
categories of 'proscribable' and 'non-proscribable' cannot be done by dividing them into
'partisan' and 'nonpartisan.' The proper inquiry is a balancing of government needs and
private rights." The inadequacy of analyses relying on partisan/nonpartisan distinctions is
manifest in states like Minnesota, where most elective offices are nonpartisan by statute. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 203A.21 (1975). See Johnson v. State Civil Serv. Dep't, 280 Minn. 61, 157 N.W.2d
747 (1968).
"0 See Phillips v. City of Flint, 57 Mich. App. 394, 225 N.W.2d 780 (2d Div. 1975). See also
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 591-92 (1970).
191 See note 137supra.
192 As the Court stated in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963): "Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity."
193 The Court in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947), emphasized:
"Expressions, public or private, on public affairs, personalities and matters of public interest,
not an objective of party action, are unrestricted by law so long as the government employee
does not direct his activities toward party success."
14 See notes 95-127 and accompanying text supra.
195 The inherent problems of invoking facial overbreadth analysis against LSCA on-duty
restrictions are equally applicable to these off-duty provisions. See notes 137, 161-62 supra.
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the citizenry; (2) legal services attorneys and other attorneys; and (3)
part-time and staff legal services attorneys. To the extent that these
classifications are based on criteria such as poverty, 196 or touch upon
important rights such as expression, voting, or candidacy, they are
arguably violative of the equal protection clause as applied to the
federal government through the fifth amendment due process
clause.197 Although a few Congressmen expressed some concern
about the equal protection ramifications of the proposed statute,198
the history of Hatch Act litigation suggests that courts will be reluc-
tant to apply an equal protection analysis and will be more receptive
to a first amendment argument. 99 To date, only one federal court
has adopted the strict equal protection analysis.2 °0
2. The "New" Hatch Act Incorporated into the LSCA
If section 2996f(a)(6) is interpreted to incorporate the "new"
Hatch Act, only partisan and nonpartisan candidacies are prohib-
ited.2 °1 Incorporation of the new version, therefore, gives rise to far
less restrictive provisions than does incorporation of the old version.
The available constitutional arguments are correspondingly re-
duced.
In evaluating these candidacy restrictions, it is first necessary to
determine whether they should be subject to the easily satisfied
rational basis standard generally applicable to employee prohi-
bitions,20 2 or to the stricter test reserved for restrictions affecting first
amendment and other fundamental rights.203 This determination
depends upon the status of the right to candidacy under the Con-
stitution.20 4 The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that seek-
"6 One critic has suggested that the New York State Appellate Division restrictions on
poverty law firms (see note 95 supra) violate the equal protection clause. Botein, supra note 23,
at 763-64.
£07 See note 178 and accompanying text supra.
1 119 CONG. REc. 20,741 (1973) (remarks of Representative Meeds).
1" As has been demonstrated, the equal protection aspects of the LSCA at least serve to
make the first amendment arguments more persuasive. See note 178 supra.
210 In Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (Ist Cir. 1973), the First Circuit used an equal
protection approach to strike down a city charter provision that forbade civil servants from
becoming candidates for public office. Although Mancuso has not been explicitly overruled, it
has only been cited with approval in two cases: Magill v. Lynch, 400 F. Supp. 84, 85 (D.R.I.
1975); Lecci v. Cahn, 360 F. Supp. 759, 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 493 F.2d 826 (2d
Cir. 1974).
20! See notes 106-07 and accompanying textsupra.
202 See note 130 supra.
202 See notes 137-38 supra.
214 See Le Clercq, The Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Participation, 8 INDIANA L.
REv. 607 (1975). The author constructs a "federally secured right of political candidacy" from
the confluence of fundamental voting and association rights. Id. at 625-36.
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ing elective office is a protected form of expression. °5 In fact, the
Court has recently upheld limitations on such activity. 20 6 Neverthe-
less, there is a strong argument that candidacy rights are embodied
in the first amendment through the close relationship of candidacy
to fundamental rights of political expression, association, and vot-
ing. This view is bolstered by two recent Supreme Court cases. In
Williams v. Rhodes207.the Court implied that the right to candidacy is
protected by the first amendment. That implication was strength-
ened by the Court's finding in Buckley v. Valeo20 8 that cam-
paign spending is protected first amendment expression. Several
federal and state courts have followed the Court's suggestion in
Williams and Buckley.2°9
Even if it is assumed that the right to candidacy is constitution-
ally protected, off-duty restrictions would probably still survive a
first amendment challenge. The staff attorney's interest in running
for elective office becomes less significant in light of the many other
outlets for political expression available under section 2996f(a)(6) if
it incorporates the "new" Hatch Act.210 Although the nonpartisan
aspect of the provision would perhaps be vulnerable, the restriction
might be deemed compelling on the basis that even nonpartisan
candidacies would be time-consuming and thus directly interfere
with an attorney's ability to perform on the job. In addition, either
partisan or nonpartisan office-seeking might cause the Corporation
to be identified with political issues, a posture the LSCA explicitly
seeks to avoid.2 1 ' Several federal and state decisions upholding
restrictions on partisan and nonpartisan candidacies applied to gov-
205 In Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 195 (1973), the First Circuit Court of Appeals
stated: "The Supreme Court has never directly decided this point [whether there is a first
amendment right to candidacy]. However, Williams v. Rhodes, [393 U.S. 23 (1968)], strongly
suggests that the activity of seeking public office is among those rights protected by the First
Amendment."
206 In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), the Court upheld California legislation that
denied independent ballot designation to candidates with recent partisan affiliations. A Texas
law requiring candidates to submit voter petitions to obtain ballot position was approved in
American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974). In Jeness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971), the
Court upheld a similar Georgia statute.
207 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968). Williams examined an Ohio statutory scheme that made it
virtually impossible for minority party electors to obtain a place on the state's presidential
ballot.
210 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
200 See, e.g., Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 196 (1st Cir. 1973); Johnson v. State Civil
Serv. Dep't, 280 Minn. 61, 157 N.W.2d 747 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Moak,
452 Pa. 482, 307 A.2d 884 (1973).
210 See notes 106-07 and accompanying textsupra. These alternative outlets for political
expression are highly significant. See note 193 and accompanying text supra.
211 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(e)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
[Vol. 61:734
DEPOLITICIZING LEGAL AID
ernment employees, also support the conclusion that the balance
would be struck in favor of governmental interests. 12
CONCLUSION
The Legal Services Corporation Act contains diverse provisions
ostensibly designed to insulate the program from political pressures
and guarantee the program's nonpartisan, professional stance. This
Note, however, has demonstrated that at least two of these attempts
to "depoliticize" legal services threaten constitutional rights. Provi-
sions that forbid the Corporation and its grantees from represent-
ing clients in desegregation and abortion suits contravene the clients'
equal protection and due process rights. Moreover, the sweeping
political restrictions imposed upon LSC attorneys unjustifiably de-
prive those attorneys. of first amendment rights.
Apart from these constitutional considerations, more funda-
mental questions regarding congressional attempts to create a politi-
cally neutral legal: services corporation emerge from the foregoing
discussion. Under- the broad cloak of "depoliticization," Congress
sought to. do more than merely establish political neutrality and
professional independence for the new program; restrictions on
classes of litigation and attorney activities reflect attempts to protect
the societal status quo and avoid controversy. These designs are
attributable to either congressional naivete or lack of commitment
to the goal of providing legal services to the indigent. The essence of
the legal services ideal is to afford hitherto powerless citizens a
means of vindicating their legal rights. This vindication, whether in
the area of landlord-tenant, consumer, welfare, abortion, or de-
segregation law, inevitably disturbs society's existing power relation-
ships. It would be impossible for a legal services program to repre-
sent its clientele effectively and at the same time avoid political
controversy. 3 Thus, some of the restrictive provisions in the Act
reveal a congressional decision to withhold full legal assistance from the
2'2 See, e.g., Gray v. City of Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281, 1288 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Boston
Police Patrol Ass'n, Inc. v. Boston, 326 N.E.2d 314 (1975); State ex rel. Gonzales v. Manzagol,
87.N.M. 230, 531 P.2d 1203 (1975). Contra, De Stefano v. Wilson, 96 N.J. Super. 592,233 A.2d
682 (L. Div. 1967); Minielly v. Oregon, 242 Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966).
2"3 As Dean Roger C. Cramton, Chairman of the LSC Board of Directors, pointed out in
a speech before the California Bar Association on September 24, 1975: "If a legal service
program does not arouse some controversy it probably isn't doing its job, which is to provide
the poor full, zealous and effective representation." Cramton, The Task Al/,ad in Legal Services,
61 A.B.A.J. 1339, 1343 (1975).
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poor in order to avoid governmental involvement in certain particu-
larly sensitive social issues.
Ironically, although Congress attempted the impracticable task
of disengaging the Corporation from political controversy, it actu-
ally exposed the program to powerful new political pressures. Con-
gressional desire to guarantee that the LSC not facilitate politically
unpopular developments in abortion and desegregation law legit-
imizes future attacks on the Corporation on the basis of the
results it obtains for its clients. Similarly, because the Act focuses
attention on the activities of Corporation personnel, LSC attorneys
are vulnerable to criticism motivated by hostility toward the objec-
tives of the program but expressed in the sanctimonious tones of
nonpartisanship. Most significantly, legislative debate and ultimate
passage of the LSCA has put the program on notice that its activities
will be thoroughly scrutinized by Congress. Because the Corpora-
tion relies upon congressional appropriations for its very existence,
it can only survive by carefully measuring and conforming to the
shifting political winds.
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